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Applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Single-Member

Offices
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act1 (Act) in 1982, it
revised section 2,2 the Act's general prohibition against electoral discrimination. Impetus for the changes stemmed, in part, from congressional discontent with the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile
v. Bolden 3 which required proof of intentional discrimination to establish a violation of section 2.4 The 1982 amendments to section 2 rejected the Court's intent requirement; Congress provided instead that
demonstrating the discriminatory results of a political process is sufficient to establish a section 2 violation. 5 Yet in reshaping section 2,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). For a history of the amending process, see Boyd & Markman,
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1347, 1388-412 (1982). For a civil rights advocate's summary of the§ 2 amending process, see
Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE
DILU'IlON 151-57 (C. Davidson ed. 1984). But cf. A. 'I'HERNsrROM, WHOSE VOTES CoUNT?:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 79-137 (1987).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1982) states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in
the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
3. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
4. The Senate Report discussing the amendments to § 2 states:
S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit any voting practice or
procedure that results in discrimination. This amendment is designed to make clear that
proof of discriminatory intents is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. It
thereby restores the legal standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents,
which applied prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden.
s. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS
177, 179 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also id. at 193. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Senate Report is an "authoritative source" for interpreting amended section 2.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). "Plaintiffs ••. must show that the challenged system or practice in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities
being denied equal access to the political process." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 205 (emphasis added). For an extended discussion of the shift from a Bolden standard to a results test,
see Parker, The ''Results Test" of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715 (1983). Essentially, plaintiffs have a choice between proving discriminatory results or intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of
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Congress did more than simply revise the standard of proof. Congress
also added sweeping language to section 2, guaranteeing equal opportunities for minorities6 to participate in the political process (the participation prong) and to elect candidates of their choice (the election
prong). 7
Courts generally have taken a moderate approach when interpreting amended section 2, expanding its scope in some areas8 and restricting its scope in others. 9 The courts have given an especially restrictive
interpretation to section 2 as it applies to single-member offices. A
single-member office differs from a multi-member office because
greater power is concentrated in one individual and no comparable
office exists in the jurisdiction. Examples of single-member offices include the mayor of a city and the chairperson of a county commission.
A multi-member office, in contrast, has counterparts with equivalent
power in the jurisdiction. A city councilperson or a member of a state
legislature holds a multi-member office. Two courts of appeals and
one district court have held or suggested that single-member offices are
exempt from the coverage of the Act. 10
Exempting single-member offices from challenge, however, may
impede section 2's goal of ensuring minorities an equal opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice and to participate in the political process. Because of their distinct power, single-member offices held by
officials unsympathetic to minorities have a greater potential than
other offices to diminish minority influence in the political process. At
the same time, this distinctive power of single-member offices means
that if these offices are held by minorities, or at least open to their
participation, these offices may produce greater opportunities for minority influence than would multi-member offices. Yet, courts may be
Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467-69 (M.D. Ala. 1988), a./fd. sub nom. Dillard v. Chilton City
Commn., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 205.
6. This Note uses the terms blacks, minorities, and minority group interchangeably. Similarly, this Note employs the terms whites, majority, and majority group interchangeably. Black
citizens are a subset of the racial and language minority groups protected by the Voting Rights
Act. The Act prevents electoral discrimination based on race, color, or membership in a language minority group. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a) and 1973b{f)(2) {1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982); see supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
8. Most notably, courts have held that amended § 2 covers elections for state court judges.
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 109
S. Ct. 390 (1988); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F.
Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988). See generally Taylor, Elections far Judges in Tunnoil, Natl. L.J.,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
9. For example, courts have held that a minority group must be able to show it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a contested district as a prerequisite
to a vote dilution claim under § 2. This requirement makes it difficult for a minority group
which is not geographically compact to establish a § 2 violation even though the group has une·
qual access to the political process. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986); McNeil v.
Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 942, 947 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769
(1989); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1203-04 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
10. See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
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reluctant to consider section 2 challenges to single-member offices because courts do not understand how the combination of election for
these offices and the conduct of these officeholders after an election
can violate the goals of section 2.
This Note questions whether an exemption for single-member offices is justified. Part I provides a brief overview of the Voting Rights
Act and the types of discrimination in the political process to which it
applies., Part I then reviews the decisions on single-member offices,
including the courts' attempts to define single-member offices. This
Part concludes neither Congress nor the Supreme Court dictates an
exemption for single member offices. Instead, single-member offices
should be open to challenge if they hamper the achievement of section
2's goals. Part II identifies the goals of section 2 by developing a
number of theories to give meaning to the opportunity to participate
and elect language of section 2. This Part concludes the goal of section 2 is to bolster civic inclusion in the political process by eliminating the lingering effects of race discrimination. Part III then tests the
exemption for single-member offices against the goal of section 2. This
Note concludes that the exemption actually thwarts section 2's goal
and, therefore, single-member offices should be open to challenge
under section 2. Finally, Part IV develops guidelines for applying section 2 to single-member offices.
I. AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
DECISIONS REGARDING SINGLE-MEMBER OFFICES

This Part begins with an overview of the Voting Rights Act, including the three forms of electoral discrimination frequently challenged under section 2 of the Act. Section I.A argues that the three
forms of electoral discrimination adequately describe some, but not
all, violations of section 2 by single-member offices. Section I.B reviews decisions on single-member offices, concentrating on the reasoning used by courts to exempt these offices from section 2 challenges.
Section I.C questions the exemption for single-member offices by establishing that neither Congress nor the Court mandated an exemption for these offices.
A.

The Coverage of the Voting Rights Act

In response to the considerable voting obstacles faced by blacks, 11
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 12 The Act contains
three key sections aimed at preventing electoral discriminatibn. Section 2 establishes the basic definition of a violation of the Act. 13 This
11. For a description of these obstacles, see A. THERNsrROM, supra note 1, at 1-2; see also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 182.
12. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1982).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982). See supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
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section applies nationwide to prohibit electoral discrimination. t4 For
example, section 2 prohibits election practices that discourage minority citizens from voting or running for office. ts Section 2 also attacks
election devices, such as at-large elections, that dilute the influence of
minority voters. t6 Section 4 of the Act suspends the use of "tests or
devices" designed to prevent minorities from registering and voting in
jurisdictions specified by a trigger formula.t 7 In addition, the Attorney General is authorized to send in federal examiners to register voters or monitor the conduct of elections in covered jurisdictions.ts
Section 5 requires jurisdictions identified by the trigger formula, and
therefore covered by seetion 4, to precleart 9 any changes in voting or
election laws with federal authorities. 20
Section 4 epitomizes the Act's initial focus on individuals' access to
the ballot.21 The original Act, however, also recognized and protected
group participation in the political process.22 After the Act passed,
group participation began to receive attention both from officials in
jurisdictions covered by section 4 and from Congress. Officials, while
allowing some individual blacks to register and vote, shifted their attention to devices designed to diminish the influence of black voters as
a group. 23 These practices are commonly known as vote dilution. 24
14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 192 ("Section 2 - the Act's general prohibition
against voting discrimination -·applies to every state and county.").
15. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
16. See infra section III.B.1.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982). For example, if in the 1964 presidential elections a jurisdiction
required a literacy test or similar device and if less than half of its electorate registered or voted,
then the jurisdiction was covered under § 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1982).
18. 42 u.s.c. § 1973d-f (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). All covered jurisdictions must submit any "standard, practice
or procedure with respect to voting" to the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department for
advance approval. The Division then has 60 days to determine whether the proposed standard,
practice, or procedure has a discriminatory purpose or effect. If so, the Division can prevent the
jurisdiction from implementing the change.
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 182. For extended discussions of§ 5, see Days &
Guinier, Enforcement ofSection 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra
note 1, at 167; Slawsky, A Local Government's Guide to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12
URB. LAW. 700 (1972); MacCoon, The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirement of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 107 (1979); Comment, Vote Dilution,

Discriminatory Results, and Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a
Violation ofSection 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1203, 1209-21. For a discussion of the interplay between §§ 2 and 5 of the Act, see McKenzie & Krauss, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act: An Analysis of the 1982 Amendment, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 16871 (1984); see also Jones, Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Limited but Important
Impact, 73 NATL. Clvlc REv. 176 (1984).
21. See generally A. THERNSTROM, supra note 1 (arguing that the Voting Rights Act was
only concerned with individual access to the ballot).
22. See Karlan & McCrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail Themstrom on the
Voting Rights Act (Book Review), 4 J.L. & PoL. 751, 756-57 (1988).
23. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 183 ("Following the dramatic rise in registration, a
broad array of dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote.").
24. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 398 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) ("The right to vote can
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Congress reacted by renewing and expanding the coverage of the Act
in 197025 and 1975.2 6 In this way, Congress concentrated on the quality of a group's enfranchisement, rather than an individual's mere access to the ballot.
After the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Bolden 27 in
1980, many observers argued that the decision thwarted Congress' desire to expand minority participation in the political process. 28 In
Bolden, the Court held that section 2 of the Act required proof of
intentional discrimination. 29 Congress responded to this decision in
1982. Along with renewing sections of the Act due to expire, 3° Congress also amended section 2 to establish that proof of discriminatory
results is adequate to establish a violation of section 2. 31 Congress
framed section 2's results test in the language of equal opportunity. 32
Thus, section 2 has become the primary vehicle for combating discrimination in the political process.
Typically, plaintiffs challenge three types of electoral discrimination under section 2. 33 The first type, disenfranchisement, prevents or
discourages citizens from voting. Disenfranchisement may be accombe affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a
ballot."). For more information on vote dilution, see infra notes 37, 102-16 and accompanying
text.
25. Congress renewed the Act in 1970 to attack "obstructionist tactics" employed by Southern jurisdictions to exclude blacks from the political process. See Joint Views of Ten Members of
the Judiciary Committee Relating to the Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 116 CoNG. REc. 5517, 5520-21, 5529 (Mar. 2, 1970).
·
26. In 1975, congressional hearings demonstrated that covered jurisdictions continued to dilute the votes of minority groups. Congress renewed the Act to counter these practices. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Voting Rights Act Extension, S. Rep. No. 295, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1975). In addition, Congress expanded the coverage of the Act to protect
language minority citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(l) (1982) (congressional findings of voting
discrimination against language minorities). See generally UNITED STATES CoMMISSION ON
ClvIL RlGHTS, THE VOTING RlGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 76-88 (1981) [hereinafter
U.S. CoMMISSION].
27. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Derfuer, Nondiscrimination in Districting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING lssUES 65, 65-66 (B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. McKay & H. Scarrow eds. 1982) (arguing that Bo/den's intent standard made successful § 2 challenges "well-nigh impossible"); Miller
& Packman, Amended Section 2 ofthe Voting Rights Act· What Is the Intent of the Results Test?,
36 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 n.35 (1987) (outlining evidence from Extension of the Voting Rights Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm.,
97 Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 203 ("[A]fter Bolden
litigators virtually stopped filing new vote dilution cases. Moreover, the decision had a direct
impact on voting dilution cases that were making their way through the federal judicial
system.").
29. 446 U.S. at 66-68.
30. Congress renewed the coverage of the special provisions of the Act, §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
42
§ 1973 (1982).
31. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
32. 42
§ 1973(b) (1982).
33. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION,
supra note 1, at 3-5.

u.s.c.

u.s.c.
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plished either directly, by prohibiting minorities from voting, or "indirectly by rules and practices that on their face are not discriminatory
but in fact discourage a group of potential voters from casting a ballot. "34 Examples of disenfranchisement include purges of registration
rolls, establishment of difficult registration and voting procedures, and
the threat of reprisals against minority voters. 35
A second form of electoral discrimination, candidate diminution,
occurs when candidates representing the interests of a group of voters
are prevented or discouraged from running. Examples of candidate
diminution include changing government posts from elective to appointive when a minority candidate has a chance of winning, setting
high filing and bonding fees, and increasing the number of signatures
required on qualifying petitions. 36
Vote dilution is the third form of electoral discrimination often
challenged under section 2. Vote dilution is "a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting" by a white majority voting group "to diminish
the voting strength" of a minority group. 3 7
34. Id. at 3.
35. See, e.g., U.S. CoMMISSION, supra note 26, at 22-24 (harassment and intimidation in
registration); id. at 27-28 (purging and reregistration); id. at 29-31 (inconvenient polling places);
id. at 34-35 (harassment and intimidation in voting); see also Voting Rights Act, RunoffPrimaries

and Registration Barriers: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Commission on the Judiciary, Rep. No. 119, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12024, 209 (1983) [hereinafter Registration Barriers]; Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D.
Ala. 1988) (election procedures discriminated against minority groups); Mississippi State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (cumbersome registration
procedures violated§ 2); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) (proposed location of
polling place would be substantial deterrent to voting by blacks); Comment, The Purging of
Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483
(1988).
36. See, e.g., U.S. CoMMISSION, supra note 26, at 59-61 (detailing impediments to minority
candidates and their supporters); SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 183 (noting that elective
posts were made appointive to prevent minority candidates from gaining office); Velasquez v.
City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1984) (minority candidate for city council testified
that he and his family suffered "continuous threats and abuses" during and after his candidacy);
L. McDONALD, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTII: TEN YEARS OF LmGATION CHALLENGING
CoNTINUING DISCRIMINATION AGAINsr MINORITIES 111-12 (1982) (a special report from the
American Civil Liberties Union that discusses high filing and bonding fees).
37. Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra
note 1, at 4. Davidson identifies a number of distinctive characteristics about vote dilution.
First, the process of vote dilution is more subtle than the other forms of discrimination. Nothing
in the wording of "dilutionary laws" suggests they are discriminatory and the laws may not
produce discriminatory results in every case. Id. Second, dilution is a group phenomenon. "It
occurs because the propensity of an identifiable group to vote as a bloc waters down the voting
strength of another identifiable group, under certain conditions." Id. Finally, the diminished
power caused by vote dilution does not result from the behavior of the group whose votes are
. diluted. Instead, electoral practices that operate in a discriminatory fashion when combined with
bloc voting by the majority cause vote dilution. Id. at 5.
A number of electoral structures and practices can cause vote dilution. At-large elections are
probably the most common form of dilutionary device. See infra notes 173-97 and accompanying text. Run-olfrequirements may also cause vote dilution. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. Other examples of election practices that may result in vote dilution include anti-
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The three traditionally recognized forms of electoral discrimination indicate how a single-member office can violate the Act in ways
similar to multi-member offices. For example, a discriminatory slating
process can dilute minority voting strength whether the office being
slated is a mayor (a single-member office) or city councilperson (a
multi-member office). 38 Likewise, if an official refuses to distribute registration information to a minority candidate running for either a single- or niulti-member office, candidate diminution occurs regardless of
whether the official holds a single- or multi-member post. 39 The three
traditional types of electoral discrimination, however, fail to account
adequately for unique violations of the Act caused by single-member
officeholders. For instance, a chairperson of a county commission,
elected at-large, may employ his enhanced power to diminish the influence of associate commissioners chosen by the minority community.
Here, the minority citizens may be having their votes diluted by the atlarge elections for the chairperson.40 "Vote dilution" describes this
effect, but it fails to account for how the concentrated political power
of the chairperson's office enables him to dilute the influence of the
minority groups' elected representatives. The chairperson's actions
produce a hybrid violation of section 2: both "vote dilution" as the atlarge elections place the chairperson beyond reach of minority voters
and an impermissible "concentration of power" in the chairperson
that diminishes a minority group's opportunity to participate in the
political process.
single shot devices, decreasing the size of a government body, exclusive slating groups, and gerrymandering. Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION,
supra note 1, at 6-9.
38. Discriminatory slating is cognizable under§ 2. See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324, 1325-27 (N.D.
ill. 1989); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 679 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Va. 1988), revd., 883 F.2d 1232 (4th
Cir. 1989),petitionforcertfiled, 58 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1989) (No. 89-989). A slating
process can be used to diminish minority participation in the political process in two ways. First,
a slating organization could exclude minorities from any participation in the selection of candidates and select no minority candidates. This is similar to the procedure employed in the
"Jaybird primaries." Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Second, a slating group could exclude minorities from participation in the slating process, yet choose a "minority" candidate.
This candidate, however, often does not represent the interest of the minority community, rather
the candidate is weak and owes his allegiance to the slating group. This is particularly insidious
because it creates the illusion that the minority group is participating in the political process. See
e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert granted sub
nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975), ajfd., 424 U.S. 636
(1976):
[W]e cannot endorse the view that the success of black candidates at the polls necessarily
forecloses the possibility of dilution of the black vote. . • . [S]uch success might be attributable to political support motivated by different considerations - namely that election of a
black candidate will thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds.
485 F.2d at 1307.
39. See, e.g., Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984) (hostility towards
minority candidates for justice of the peace and county clerk relevant to the § 2 inquiry).
40. See infra section 111.B.1 for a detailed description of how at-large elections can dilute
minority voting strength.
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Courts may not recognize this hybrid violation of section 2 because
they have held that single-member offices cannot dilute minority voting strength.41 But focusing narrowly on vote dilution may blind
courts to the threat posed by the concentrated power of single-member
offices. If a minority group can elect representatives, but these representatives have their influence diminished by single-member offices immunized from section 2's scrutiny, the right to an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process becomes an empty right. The next
section will review the response of courts to section 2 challenges of
single-member offices.
B. Reviewing the Decisions on Single-Member Offices
Four courts have considered section 2 challenges to election methods for single-member offices or the structure of these offices. City of
Ca"ollton Branch ofthe NAACP v. Stallings 42 involved single-member
office issues, even though the Eleventh Circuit did not formally recognize the concept.43 Two other cases, Butts v. City of New York44 and
Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 45 recognize the concept of single-member
offices without formally defining the term. A fourth case, Christian
Leadership Conference v. Siege/man, 46 attempted to synthesize Butts
and Dillard into a more formal definition of single-member office. According to the courts in Butts, Dillard, and Siege/man, if an office qualifies as single-member, it is excluded from the coverage of section 2.
With such a drastic result dependent on whether an office is denominated single-member, an understanding of the courts' use of the term
is important. Consequently, this section reviews the cases presenting
single-member office issues and the courts' understanding of the
concept.

1. City ofCa"ollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings
Although the Eleventh Circuit in Stallings did not specifically recognize the single-member office concept, the case is nevertheless significant because the court considered expanding a single-member post
into a multi-member body. Carroll County, located in the west-central part of Georgia, was governed by a single county commissioner.47
41. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
42. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988).
43. The Eleventh Circuit did not address the single-member issue. The defendants, however,
raised the issue as the principal reason for the Court to grant their petition for a writ of certiorari.
Brief for Petitioners at 16-20, Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936
(1988) (No. 87-1186) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
44. 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
45. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987).
46. 714 F. Supp. 511, 518-20 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
47. The court found:

Note -
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In 1980, blacks comprised 17 percent of the total population of Carroll
County and 15.3 percent of the voting age population. The NAACP
alleged that the one-person form of government in Carroll County diluted black voting strength. In fact, "[n]o black person has run successfully for the office of commissioner throughout the history of
Carroll County."48 Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that the
single-member commission was adopted for the discriminatory purpose of limiting black voter strength.49
·
The Eleventh Circuit highlighted the difficulties the at-large election for a single commissioner presented for minority voters. 50 In Carroll County, black citizens had no opportunity to elect representatives
of their choice because their voting strength was submerged by the
white majority. The existence of racially polarized voting, combined
with at-large elections for the single commissioner, decreased blacks'
opportunities to engage in the political process. 51
To cure the discrimination in the Carroll County political process,
the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to consider expanding
the county's single-member commission to a three- or five-person commission chosen by district. 52 Ordering consideration of an expanded
commission is significant because it shows the willingness of a court to
consider alternatives to single-member offices. In effect, the court recognizes that single-member offices should not be immunized from
challenge.
2.

Butts -

The ''Share of" Representation Concept

In Butts v. City of New York, 53 the Second Circuit became the first
court to exempt single-member offices from section 2's coverage. In
Butts, plaintiffs challenged a New York statute requiring that if no
candidate for the office of mayor, city council president, or comptroller of the City of New York received 40 percent or more of the votes
cast in a party's general primary, then the Board of Elections must
The Carroll County Commissioner is the entire governing body for the county. The commissioner is vested with the powers, among other things: to direct, control and convey the
county property; to abolish wards, to establish election precincts and militia districts according to law, to select and appoint all minor offices of the county, whose election or appointment is not otherwise fixed by law.
829 F.2d 1547, 1551 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988).
48. 829 F.2d at 1551.
49. 829 F.2d at 1551-52.
50. By focusing on the at-large character of the single-member commission, the Eleventh
Circuit was able to draw heavily on the Supreme Court's analysis in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit considered the single county commissioner "to be in all
essential respects comparable with the multi-member district discussed by the court in Gingles."
829 F.2d at 1549. For more on Gingles, see infra notes 102-16 and accompanying text.
51. 829 F.2d at 1559.
52. 829 F.2d at 1563.
53. 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
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conduct a runoff between the two top vote-getters in the general primary. s4 Minority group voters argued that this runoff requirement
diluted their voting strength in violation of section 2. The Second Circuit rejected this challenge, due, in large part, to the court's belief that
section 2 did not apply to the offices challenged because they were
single-member posts.
The court, without expressly defining single-member offices, outlined some characteristics of these offices by contrasting them with
multi-member government bodies. In the court's view:
There can be no equal opportunity for representation within an office
filled by one person. Whereas, in an election to a multi-member body, a

minority class has an opportunity to secure a share of representation
equal to that of other classes by electing its members from districts in
which it is dominant, there is no such thing as a ''share" of a singlemember office. ss
The court found this distinction implicit in the Supreme Court's City
of Port Arthur v. United States s6 decision. In Port Arthur, the Court

struck down a runoff requirement appended to the city's at-large voting system for seats on the multi-member city council, but made no
mention of a similar runoff requirement for the election of mayor.
3. Dillard - Blending Butts' "Share of" Approach with a
Functional Approach
The significance of the Dillard v. Crenshaw County s1 decision lies
in the Eleventh Circuit's creative solution to the voting rights concerns
raised by a single-member office. In Dillard, black voters challenged
Calhoun County, Alabama's commission form of government. Blacks
comprised 17.6 percent of the county's population, and 15.9 percent of
the voting population. Blacks in the county were "on average educationally and economically less advanced than whites."S 8 In addition,
the black community was politically cohesive and geographically insular. The citizens of Calhoun County had never elected a black county
54. 779 F.2d at 143.
55. 779 F.2d at 148 (emphasis added). Similarly, the court stated: "We cannot, however,
take the concept of a class's impaired opportunity for equal representation and uncritically transfer it from the context of elections for multi-member bodies to that of elections for single-member
offices." 779 F.2d at 148.
Although the court never explicitly gives examples of single-member offices, one can assume
that the court considered New York City's mayor, 'city council president, and comptroller to be
single-member offices because the challenged primary law applied to them.
The Second Circuit's sweeping language suggests that it exempted all single-member offices
from section 2 challenge. However, the actual holding may be narrower. The court stated: "It
suffices to rule in this case that a run-off election requirement in such an election does not deny
any class an opportunity for equal representation and therefore cannot violate the Act." 779
F.2d at 149.
56. 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
57. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987).
58. 831 F.2d at 247.
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commiss1oner. The lack of black representatives stemmed, in part,
from the racially polarized voting in the county. 5 9
The parties in Dillard agreed that Calhoun County's at-large elections for two associate commissioners and one county commission
chairperson violated section 2 by diluting minority voting strength. 60
The district court invited the parties to respond with acceptable alternatives. Calhoun County proposed expanding the commission to five
associate commissioners chosen by district and one chairperson
elected at-large. 61 Plaintiffs accepted the five-member proposal, but
argued that the at-large chairperson position would continue to dilute
minority voting strength. Hence, the only issue on appeal was
whether retaining an at-large chairperson would deprive the plaintiffs
of an adequate remedy for the admitted section 2 violation. 62 Calhoun
County tried to insulate the chairperson from a section 2 challenge by
invoking the Butts exemption for single-member offices. 63 The county
emphasized that the chairperson would serve primarily as an administrator with limited legislative duties within the commission.
The court, while recognizing the single-member office exception,
held that it did not apply in this case. The court acknowledged that
for some offices, such as sheriffs, probate judges, and tax collectors,
"at-large, non-proportional elections are inherent to their nature as
single-person officers elected by direct vote. Such single offices are
most commonly limited to non-legislative functionaries." 64
The court denied the proposed Calhoun County chairperson single-member status because "the overlap between the roles of the commission and the chairperson do not allow us to consider this office as a
separate, single-office position." 65 Ultimately, the court believed the
other commission members "would have their voting strength and influence diluted" by the chairperson. 66 As a result, Calhoun County's
59. 831 F.2d at 247.
60. 831 F.2d at 248.
61. 831 F.2d at 248.
62. 831 F.2d at 248.
63. 831 F.2d at 251.
64. 831 F.2d at 251 (citation omitted).
65. 831 F.2d at 251. Similarly, the court stated: "[W]e are not satisfied that the chairperson
will be sufficiently uninfluential in the activities initiated and in the decisions made by the commission proper to be evaluated as a single-member office." 831 F.2d at 253. The court also noted
that "[t]he history that brought this case to this Court is a commission which over time skewed
power heavily into the hands of the chairperson." 831 F.2d at 252.
66. 831 F.2d at 253 (quoting Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 296 (M.D. Ala.
1986)). The court stated that under the new plan, the power of the chairperson "'stays where it
has always been.'" 831 F.2d at 252 n.13. These powers included broad discretion in appointments for carrying out the prescribed work of the county, including services and construction
projects; resolving citizens' complaints about county services; representing the county on various
local and state boards; lobbying the county's interests to the legislature; overseeing county construction projects; liaising with military installations in the county; and assuring the execution of
commission policies by other county officers. 831 F.2d at 251.
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proposal would not completely remedy the section 2 violation. In
place of the at-large chairperson, the court proposed a number of alternatives: a rotating chairperson, a hired executive, or "perhaps a
clearly delimited job description along with other safeguards" to prevent the chairperson from infringing on the work of the associate commissioners. 67 Any alternative had to preserve fully the integrity of the
elected associate commissioners. On remand, the parties chose, and
the district court approved, a rotating chairperson. 68
4. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siege/man
In Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Siege/man, 69 an
Alabama federal district court drew on both Butts and Dillard in its
attempt to characterize the essence of a single-member office. The
plaintiffs in Siege/man challenged the State of Alabama's use of numbered place, at-large elections for state circuit and district judges, arguing that these elections violated section 2 by diluting black voting
strength. The defendants countered that "section 2 does not apply to
the Alabama judiciary because state circuit and district judges hold
'single-member offices.' " 70 The court, in rejecting the defendant's argument, defined single-member offices and demonstrated why the
judges in this case did not fit the definition.
The court, relying on Butts and Dillard, stated that the "true hallmark of a single-member office is that only one position is being filled
for an entire geographic area, and the jurisdiction can therefore be
divided no smaller." 71 Here, the court imposed a limit on the coverage of the Act without explicitly announcing it.· The court assumed if
it could not imagine an office being filled by more than one person,
then it must be single-member. For example, the court cannot imagine more than one person holding the office of mayor or city council
president. 12
The court rejected the'defendants' asserted alternative definition of
a single-member office as one in which "the full authority of that office
67. 831 F.2d at 253.
68. 679 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
69. 714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
70. 714 F. Supp. at 518.
71. 714 F. Supp. at 518 n.19. The court also stated that a single-member office refers to a
situation where under no circumstances will there ever be more than one such position in a
particular jurisdiction. The court noted it is possible to have more than one district or circuit
judge in a particular jurisdiction and, thus, judges could not be single-member offices under its
definition.
72. As will be discussed infra, this is an incorrect assumption. While technically only one
person at a time can serve as mayor or council president, different people can serve during any
given term. As the Dillard court suggested, an office can be rotated among commission members. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987). Or additional offices can
be created, such as a vice-mayor.
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is exercised exclusively by one individual. " 73 The court noted that in
most cases "any officeholder who wields his authority independently
will coincidentally also be the only holder of his position in the entire
geographic area." 74 These two characteristics do not always co-exist,75 however, and when they do, they do so only by coincidence.
In addition, the court rejected the defendants' definition because it
did not comport with the court's view of the relationship between single-member offices and the theoretical justification for section 2. In
the case of a single-member office:
the at-large boundaries coincide with the only "district" boundaries possible; because there is only one position to be filled, it becomes impossible
to split up the jurisdiction any smaller. The concept of vote dilution is
effectively rendered meaningless and such offices are inappropriate for
section 2 vote dilution challenges.7 6

In contrast, there is no such rationale for not applying section 2 to
elected positions merely because "the full authority of that office is
exercised exclusively by one individual," as the defendants suggested.
Thus the court reasoned that the judicial offices challenged in this case
were not single-member.
5. Synthesizing the Concepts of Single-Member Offices Offered in
Butts, Dillard, and Siegelman
The Siegelman and Butts cases reflect one of the two approaches
courts have taken to single-member offices. The approach in these
cases may be termed the "share of" approach. 77 This approach relies
on the apparent truism that "there cannot be vote dilution where 'districts in which [the minority] is dominant' are physically impossible to
create." 78 For example, if blacks comprise 40 percent of a city, their
vote for a mayor's office, according to the "share of" approach, cannot
be diluted because only one district (the entire city) is at stake and this
73. 714 F. Supp. at 518 (quoting the defendants).
74. 714 F. Supp. at 518.
75. For example, in Butts, one of the three positions at issue - city council president - was
not, according to the court, an office whose full authority was exercised by one individual. Instead, the council president exercised his authority as a co-equal member of the Board of Estimates, a multi-member body. 714 F. Supp. 520 n.26.
76. 714 F. Supp. at 519-20 (footnote omitted). "In other words, where there is only one
position at stake, it is impossible that a minority's voting power has been diluted by the implementation of at-large elections, just as it is impossible to split up the area into districts in order to
enhance a minority's voting power." 714 F. Supp. at 519.
77. This approach taken in Siegelman and Butts could also be termed the "Can you imagine?" approach because the court, in effect, is saying, "Can you imagine more than one office of
this kind within a jurisdiction?" Since the court, for example, cannot imagine a town with even
the functional equivalent of more than one mayor, a mayor is deemed a single-member office.
But because the court can imagine more than one judge in a jurisdiction, a judge is not a singlemember office.
78. 714 F. Supp. at 519 (emphasis in orginal) (quoting Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.
Supp. 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986)).
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district cannot be subdivided to give minority voters a "share of" the
mayor's office.
The second approach, demonstrated in Dillard, recognizes the
"share of" concept, but casts its definition more in functional terms,
and thus can be called the "functional approach." The functional approach suggests that executive or administrative offices, because of the
functions they perform, tend to be single-member offices and therefore
beyond challenge. The Dillard court employs function as a marker of
single-member offices in conjunction with the "share of" approach.
Thus, an office would qualify as single-member both because of its
function and because a minority group could not receive a proportional "share of" the single office. 79
According to both the "share of" and "functional" approaches,
three features typically characterize single-member offices. First, to be
considered a single-member office there is traditionally only one such
position in a jurisdiction. 8° For example, a county commission traditionally has only one chairperson and a town has only one mayor. 81
Second, the power exercised by the single-member office must be
greater than that exercised by multi-member offices. Although this
may be a coincidence of having only one person holding the office, as
the Siege/man court suggests, 82 this coincidence is important since the
concentration of power in a single-member office provides an opportunity to thwart the goals of section 2. 83
79. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 (11th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that a single-member office is not subject to proportional representation issues).
80. Of course, tradition can be difficult to judge. Consider the Stollings case, supra notes 4752. In Stollings, a single county commissioner, invested with all of the county's legislative and
executive power, governed the county. The county, however, had not always been governed by a
single commissioner. At other times, three- and five-member commissions governed the county.
City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). It
would be difficult to say whether traditionally there was only one such position in this jurisdiction. This demonstrates the limited value of looking to tradition.
81. "Traditionally" is used because a chairperson could be rotated among commission members, as in Dillard. While only one member at a time holds the chair position, many members
may hold the position during a legislative term. Alternatively, two persons may share the office
of mayor.
82. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 518 (M.D. Ala.
1989).
83. Power may be concentrated in two ways that raise concern. First, consider the powers
exercised by the single county commissioner in Stallings. In that case the concentration of all the
county's legislative and executive power in one office places the office hopelessly beyond reach of
minority voters. Admittedly, this de jure total concentration of power is rare. In Georgia, only
24 of 159 counties have a single-member commission. See Respondents' Petition in Opposition
to Writ of Certiorari at 13, Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936
(1988) (No. 87-1186). But the de facto equivalent could occur. That is, all the government
power in a jurisdiction could effectively gravitate to a single-member office, like a mayor.
The second, and more typical, concentration of power occurs when a single-member office
holder debases the influence of other members of the government organization. The Dillard case
is illustrative. In Dillard, far less concern would have arisen if the chairperson were a mere
figurehead instead of an officer with powers greater than those of the other members of the
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Finally, an important indicator of a single-member office may be
that the position is elected at-large. The Siegelman court appears to
have this in mind when it mentions at-large boundaries coinciding
with the only district lines possible. 84
C. Establishing that Neither Congress nor the Court Mandated an
Exemption for Single-Member Offices
With this understanding of the challenges to single-member offices,
one can begin to question the opinions exempting these offices from
challenge. The first step in this process is to analyze the authority
these decisions draw on to support an exemption for single-member
offices. As this section will demonstrate, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court mandates an exemption for single-member offices.
Rather, applying section 2 to these offices actually furthers the goals of
the Act as it has been interpreted both by Congress and the Court.
Congress never made a distinction between single-member offices
and all other offices. None of the cases recognizing the single-member
issue cite any legislative history to support an exemption for singlemember offices. Moreover, Congress did not recognize a distinction
among types of offices based on the function an office serves. 85 This
suggests that Congress did not intend that a functional distinction between single-member offices and all others would exempt single-member offices from the Act's coverage. 86
Yet, a critic of applying the Act to single-member offices may argue that because Congress did not specifically mention single-member
offices, it did not intend for the Act to apply to them. Congress' intent
to combat racial discrimination in voting, however, requires courts to
give section 2 a broad construction. The Fifth Circuit in Chisom v.
commission. Similarly, a mayor has power concentrated in his office distinct from all other positions in the government, and he has an opportunity to depreciate the influence of other members
of the government.
84. While the at-large character may increase voting rights concerns, election at large should
not be essential for single-member status. Consider the office of a city council president elected,
not at large by the citizens, but rather by the individual council members. This office could
diminish the opportunity of a minority group to participate in the political process. Imagine that
there were ten council members in a city comprised of 70 percent white voters and 30 percent
black voters. And suppose white voters controlled seven districts and black voters three. The
seven council members allied with the white interests would be able to elect the city council
president without need of bargaining with the black representatives.
85. As the Dillard court notes: "Nowhere in the language of Section 2 nor in the legislative
history does Congress condition applicability of Section 2 on the function performed by the
elected official. The language iS only and uncompromisingly premised on the fact of nomination
or election." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-51 (11th Cir. 1987).
86. The Dillard court acknowledged the difficulty in drawing lines based on government
function. "A search for a definition of what constitutes legislative and what constitutes executive
activity in government invariably leads to the conclusion that there is no bright line between the
two realms." 831 F.2d at 252; see also Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 520 (rejecting functional
distinctions).
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Edwards 87 lends support to the proposition that even without specific
congressional consideration, the Voting Rights Act should apply to
single member offices. In the context of deciding whether the Act applied to elections for state judges, the court stated:
An overriding principle which guides any analysis of the legislative history behind the Voting Rights Act is that the Act must be interpreted in
a broad and comprehensive manner in accordance with congressional
intent to combat racial discrimination of any kind in all voting practices
and procedures. Thus, in the absence of any legislative history warranting a conclusion that section 2 does not apply to state judge elections, the
only acceptable interpretation . . . is that such elections are covered. 88

Moreover, the Senate Report on amended section 2 notes that
while the cases it cites deal with typical situations of vote dilution,
"Section 2 remains the major statutory prohibition of all voting rights
discrimination." 89 The Report also states that section 2 "prohibits
practices which, while episodic and not involving permanent structural barriers, result in the denial of equal access to any phase of the
electoral process for minority group members. "90
Although Congress did not create the single-member office exemption, the Butts court argued that the Supreme Court implicitly created
the exemption in City of Port Arthur v. United States. 91 This interpretation of Port Arthur is flawed for a variety of reasons. First, if valid,
the "implicit holding" the Butts court draws from Port Arthur would
contravene Congress' desire to have the Act interpreted broadly to
combat racial discrimination in all phases of voting. 92 Second, the
Butts court, by pointing to the plaintiffs' failure in Port Arthur to raise
a challenge to the runoff for the mayor's office, proves too much. 93 If
87. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955
(1988).
88. 839 F.2d at 1061-62 (emphasis in original).
89. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207.
90. Id.
91. 459 U.S. 159 (1982). In Port Arthur, the city, after expanding in size through annexation,
submitted to the district court for preclearance a plan for reorganizing the city government.
Under the 4-2-3 plan, the city would be divided into four single-member districts, Districts 1
through 4.
District 5, comprising Districts 1 and 4 would elect another member, as would District 6,
which combined Districts 2 and 3. Three additional members would be elected at large, one
each from Districts 5 and 6, the third at large seat to be occupied by the mayor and to have
no residency requirement. All Council seats would be governed by a majority-vote rule, that
is, run-offs would be required if none of the candidates received a majority of the votes cast.
459 U.S. at 165. The district court rejected the proposed plan because of its adverse impact on
the minority community. The court added, however, that if the plan were modified to eliminate
the majority-vote requirement with respect to the two nonmayoral, at-large candidates, and to
permit election to these two seats to be made by plurality vote, the court would consider the
defect remedied. The Court affirmed the district court's decision. 459 U.S. at 168.
92. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d at 1061.
93. The Supreme Court "made no mention of a similar run-off requirement for the election of
mayor. The later run-off was not even challenged." Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141,
148 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 478 U.S. 1021 (1986).
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the plaintiffs never raised a challenge to the mayor's office, the Court
should not go out of its way to address an issue the parties never
raised.94 Third, the Siege/man court notes that "the Port Arthur decision does not address why" the concept of vote dilution was not applied to the position of mayor. 95 "[T]here is no discussion about
which of the attributes of the office of mayor exempted it from a vote
dilution challenge." 96 Without a justification, the Siege/man court
was unwilling to accept that Port Arthur authorized an exemption for
single-member offices. 97 Further, the Court has never endorsed this
alleged implicit holding. In sum, the Supreme Court has neither implicitly nor explicitly held that single-member offices are exempt from
section 2.
So far this section has demonstrated that neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court decreed an exemption for single-member offices. The
only remaining possible justification for an exemption is the theoretical
justification offered by the "share of" approach. Essentially, this approach argues that allowing challenges to single-member offices is theoretically inconsistent with the concept of vote dilution. But if one
could show that elections for single-member offices and the conduct of
these officeholders violate the theoretical justifications for section 2,
then they should not be exempt. But what is the theory behind section
2, and what are the goals the section was designed to achieve? The
next Part addresses these issues.

II. THE

GOAL OF SECTION 2: PROVIDING MINORITY GROUPS
WITH AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY To ELECT AND To
PARTICIPATE IN THE PoLmCAL PROCESS

A coherent theory of section 2 must give meaning to both prongs
of the section: the opportunity to elect, and the opportunity to participate. 98 Unfortunately, when Congress amended section 2, it concentrated more on the mechanics of proving a violation than it did on
articulating a vision of equality in the political process.99 For instance,
94. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981) ("We decline to
consider this argument since it was not raised by either of the parties here or below."); see also
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977).
95. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.21 (M.D.
Ala. 1989).
96. Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.21.
97. Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.21.
98. As the reader will see, thinking about these as separate prongs may create a false dichotomy because one should understand the political process as a whole, not as divided into pieces.
But for ease of understanding, this distinction will be maintained for now.
99. The Senate Report speaks occasionally about the goals of the Act in general and § 2 in
particular. For example, the Report states that the Bill will insure "that the effort to achieve full
participation for all Americans in our democracy will continue in the future." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 181. But what exactly does Congress mean by "full participation"? The Report
does not offer a complete model of full participation. Instead of articulating a vision of equal
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the Senate Report develops a totality-of-the-circumstances test for section 2 violations, but it does not define equality of political opportunities.100 The Supreme Court compounded this lack of guidance in
Thornburg v. Gingles 101 by giving only limited substance to the opportunity-to-elect prong and by not addressing the opportunity-to-participate prong. To compensate for this lack of guidance, this Part draws
on the work of a number of commentators in an attempt to state what
it means to have an equal opportunity (1) to elect candidates of a
group's choice and (2) to participate in the political process.
Section II.A discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of the opportunity to elect. Section II.A also outlines the benefits that flow
from an equal opportunity to elect. Ensuring that these benefits accrue to minority groups should be an important goal of section 2. Section II.B, drawing on the work of Professor Kathryn Abrams,
provides a model of full participation in the political process that understands the process as more than merely voting. Section II.B then
outlines the benefits that flow from ensuring an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process. Section II.C concludes that the
overarching goal of section 2 should be to increase civic inclusion in
the political process by decreasing the effects of racial discrimination
in this process.
participation in the political process, Congress seems more interested in emphasizing that a re·
suits standard is a return to the pre-Bolden understanding of§ 2. See, e.g., id. at 193.
100. The totality-of-the-circumstances test, which the Senate Report develops, consists of
factors for the courts to use in determining whether a particular practice results in an unequal
opportunity to participate in the political process or elect a candidate of a minority group's
choice. Id. at 206-07. The Senate report specifically mentions the following typical factors as
evidence of an unequal opportunity to elect candidates and participate in the political process:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision
that touched the right of members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have
been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence
to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the
particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qua!·
ification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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A. Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Elect
The Supreme Court's only decision on amended section 2, Thornburg v. Gingles, is disappointing for two reasons. First, the opinion
addresses just the opportunity to elect, perhaps reserving for another
day an opportunity-to-participate claim. And second, the decision
creates confusion about the relationship between the Court's test for
vote dilution and the statutory test outlined in the Senate Report.
Overall, the Court fails to give full meaning to the opportunity to
elect. Understanding the benefits produced by equal electoral opportunities gives fuller meaning to the opportunity to elect.
1.

The Supreme Court Gives Limited Meaning in
Thornburg v. Gingles.

In Thornburg v. Gingles, 102 plaintiffs challenged the use of six
multi-member districts in North Carolina's legislative reapportionment. The Court in Gingles focused on the opportunity to elect and
did not address the opportunity-to-participate language of section 2. 103
The Court's characterization of the plaintiff's claim reveals this electoral focus. 104 Moreover, the Court concentrated solely on elections
when it discussed the essence of section· 2. 105
The Court outlined three factors (the Tripartite Test) required to
prove that the use of multi-member districts caused vote dilution.
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district. Otherwise, as in the case of an integrated district, the multi-member or at-large structure cannot be responsible for
a minority group's inability to elect its candidates. 106 Second, the minority group must be able to show its political cohesiveness. 107 Third,
the minority group must demonstrate that the white majoritr usually
votes as a bloc, thus enabling it to defeat the minority's preferred can102. 478 U.S. at 30.
103.
We have no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards
should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections.
478 U.S. at 46-47 n.12.
104. "Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than
single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a
white majority, thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice." 478 U.S. at
46 (footnotes omitted).
105. "The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 478 U.S. at 47.
106. 478 U.S. at SO.
107. According to the Court: "If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be
said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group
interests." 478 U.S. at 51.
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didate. 108 "The latter two of these factors may be demonstrated by a
showing that voting in the jurisdiction is highly racially polarized." 109
Although the Court stated a three-element test for vote dilution, it
left uncertain the relationship between its test and the Senate Report's
totality-of-the-circumstances test. 110 The Court added the requirement of a geographically compact majority to the statutory factors.11 1
The Court treated the other elements of the totality-of-the-circumstances test as "supportive of, but not essential to," a minority voter's
case. 112 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, chastised the
majority for replacing the totality-of-the-circumstances test with its
tripartite test. 11 3 The lower courts have treated the uncertain relationship between the Court's test and the totality-of-the-circumstances test
in various ways.114
While the relationship between the Court's test and the statutory
test may be uncertain, the Court exhibits a clearer understanding of
inequalit~ in the opportunity to elect. For the Court, an inequality in
the opportunity to elect is rooted in a very traditional concept of vote
dilution: a minority group is numerically submerged in a majority jurisdiction.115 If voting is racially polarized, then the preferences of the
108. The interaction of white and black bloc voting produces racially polarized voting. A
showing of racially polarized voting demonstrates that a minority group will be thwarted in atlarge elections by the majority group voting along racial lines. The court's requirement of the
usual predictability of the majority's success distinguished structural dilution from the mere loss
of an occasional election. 478 U.S. at 51.
109. Smith v. Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (E.D. Ark. 1988), ajfd., 488 U.S. 988 (1988).
110. See Abrams, "Raising Politics Up'~· Minority Political Participation & Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 464-65 (1988).
111. 478 U.S. at 50.
112. 478 U.S. at 49 n.15.
113. Justice O'Connor noted: "As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a
vote dilution claim require no reference to most of the 'Zimmer factors' ••• which were highlighted in the Senate Report." 478 U.S. at 92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. On the one hand, some courts have downplayed the tripartite test to the point of ignoring its requirements. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (M.D. Ala.
1986), affd. in part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987), reinstated on
remand, 679 F. Supp. 1546, 1547 (M.D. Ala. 1988). In contrast, courts have held that satisfying
the tripartite test is essential to a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep.
School Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1199204 (S.D. Miss. 1987); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (C.D. Ill.), appeal
dismissed. 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987).
115. The Court concentrated on two typical methods of vote dilution caused by the location
of minority voters, fracturing and packing. Fracturing occurs when district lines are drawn so
that a minority group is dispersed into districts in which the minority cannot constitute a majority. In contrast, packing occurs when a minority group is concentrated in districts in which they
comprise an excessive majority. Thus, the minority group may have more than enough votes to
win one district, but could win two districts if the districts were drawn differently. For a discussion of these methods, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REv. 523, 553 (1973); Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical
Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 465, 465-66 (1977).
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minority group will be cancelled out. Moreover, vote dilution is evil
because it
not only deprives minority voters of their preferred representatives, it
also leaves them effectively unrepresented because it allows those elected
to ignore minority interests without fear of the political consequences.
In a very real sense, racially polarized voting perpetuates the effects of
past discrimination. 116

2.

The Benefits of Equal Opportunities To Elect Candidates of a
Minority Group's Choice

Correcting and preventing the evil produced by vote dilution is obviously one of the benefits of equal electoral opportunity. But to understand how to ensure equal electoral opportunities, one must
understand the other benefits that flow from equalizing these opportunities. These are benefits associated with having an elected representative of a minority group's choice in the government. This section
discusses those benefits.
Some of the benefits produced by minority elected officials are familiar: they are those benefits traditionally associated with integration.111 The election of minority officials symbolizes that membership
on a governing body is not reserved for white citizens. 118 And the
election of minority officials provides role models for the minority
community. 119
In addition, the election of minority officials ensures that minority
positions will at least be aired in the councils of government. 120 The
election of minority officials may have the practical effect of encourag-.
ing interaction between these officials and nonminority officials. 121
Moreover, minority officials may operate as a "crucial lever" for obtaining the benefits that must be bargained for in the political process.122 For example, a black city councilmember may help his
116. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1463 (M.D. Ala. 1988),
affd. sub nom. Dillard v. Chilton City Commn., 868 F.2d 1274 (1989) (citation omitted).
117. See, e.g., Howard & Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the
Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1615, 1627 & 1631-32 (1983); see also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (Powell, J.) (recognizing the value
of diversity).
118. See, e.g., A. THERNSTROM, supra note 1, at 239-40; Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 173, 214-15 (1989).
119. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (recognizing the role
model theory but rejecting it as justification for a race-based layoff plan).
120. See Abrams, supra note 110, at 500.
121. See L. CoLE, BLACKS IN POWER 222 (1976) (the presence of black elected officials
sensitizes white elected officials); M. JEWELL & s. PATIERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 197-98, 211-12 (4th ed. 1986) (national and state legislators look to their
colleagues with specialized knowledge to guide decision making); Karlan, supra note 118, at 21619.
122. Backstrom, Problems ofImplementing Redistricting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDIS-
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constituents secure better city services. And the election of minority
officials may increase grass-roots participation in the political process
among the minority community members by creating a sense of connection with minority offici~s. 123 This final benefit illustrates that the
opportunity to elect and the opportunity to participate in the political
process often overlap.
B.

Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Participate

This section, drawing on the work of commentators, depicts a
political process that includes more than simply voting. An interpretation of section 2 that gives full meaning to the equal opportunity to
participate must protect activities that precede as well as follow elections. Both minority and nonrninority citizens receive the benefits of a
political process that ensures the equal opportunity to participate.
1. A Model Giving Meaning to the Opportunity To Participate.
Although the Gingles Court focused exclusively on the opportunity
to elect, a number of commentators have been addressing the opportunity-to-participate language of section 2. These scholars stress that the
political process concerns more than a single event - the election of a
candidate. Instead, taking part in the political process means both
pre- and post-election participation, as well as participation not directly linked to an election. 124 "[C]ourts should consider a variety of
activities - from participating in party caucuses to consulting with
elected representatives - as important components of political opportunity."125 Similarly, the ability of a minority group's elected representatives to participate in the governing process should be considered.
If a minority group can elect candidates, but these candidates are unable to engage in the process because of racially motivated impediments, then section 2 should protect the minority group.
Professor Abrams suggests that courts replace their current focus
solely on electoral opportunity with a model of "interactive participation."126 This model concentrates on group interaction in the broad
TRICTING lssuES, supra note 28, at 58; see also Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the
Distribution of Public Benefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 283 ("The evi-

dence from a growing body of research clearly indicates that black electoral participation influences the distribution of public benefits at the local level."); Campbell & Feagin, Black Politics in
the South: A Descriptive Analysis, 37 J. POL. 129, 153-56 (1975); McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1276-79 (1989).
123. See, e.g., c. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-47 (1970);
Montague, The Voting Rights Act Today, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 52, 56 (1988); Note, Affirmative Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811, 1813-14 (1981).
124. Abrams, supra note 110, at 472-74. See generally Karlan, supra note 118; Guinier,
Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393
(1989).
125. Abrams, supra note 110, at 474.
126. Id. at 488-94.
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range of political activities. Under this expansive view, courts wou1d
consider evidence that "minorities had been excluded from caucuses
or avoided by candidates, as well as the failure of legislators and
legislative policy to respond to the articu1ated interests of these
groups." 127 Where direct evidence was unavailable, courts wou1d look
to factors likely to produce failures of interaction. Important indicators would be discriminatory attitudes and the current effects of past
discrimination. 12 s
Though Congress did not articu1ate a vision of full participation in
the political process when it amended the Act, it did identify factors
that would be useful in proving a violation of the Act. 129 These factors
encompass an expansive approach to the political process beyond mere
voting. 130 In addition, the Court has incorporated a broad vision of
the political process into prior voting rights cases. 131 Similarly, a few
lower courts have taken an expanded view of the political process in
section 2 cases. 132
2.

The Benefits of Equalized Opportunity To Participate

This section examines the benefits produced by the Abrams model
of the equal opportunity to participate. The benefits of equalized op127. Id. at 493.
· 128. Id. The Senate Report (factors 1, 2, 4, 5, 6) also recognizes these as important indicators of unequal opportunities to participate in the political process. See supra note 100.
129. See supra note 100 for the factors comprising the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
130. See id. for a list of the Senate factors. For example, Senate factors 1 and 5 address
discrimination in a jurisdiction not necessarily linked to voting. The first additional factor focuses on the responsiveness of elected officials.
131. Professor Abrams identifies three lines of cases in which an expansive understanding of
the political process informs the Court's decisions. See Abrams, supra note 110, at 472-75. In
the "White Primary" cases, the Court viewed the political process as a series of interrelated
events, each significant to the outcome of the general election. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
.
The second line of cases involves candidate access to the ballot. These cases stress that political participation is a form of expression both by candidates and voters. See Munro v. Socialist
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Illinois State
Bd. of Elects. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
(1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
The third line of cases involve claims by a political group, rather than a racial group, that an
election scheme diluted their votes. In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court rejected a challenge by the Democratic Party to the plan for Indiana Legislature districts because it
found that the Democrats could participate in the full range of the political process even if they
could not directly elect a candidate. 478 U.S. at 131-32.
132. For example, the Dillard court took an expanded view of the political process when it
considered the effect of a proposed chairperson on the influence of commissioners elected by the
minority group. "(T]he members elected by a racially fair district election method would have
their voting strength and influence diluted." Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 296
(M.D. Ala. 1986); see also Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1561-62
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485
U.S. 936 (1988) (court identifies factors such as racial discrimination that diminish the opportunity of a minority group to participate in the political process).
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portunities to participate in the political process accrue not only to
minority voters but to all citizens. 133 The value to minority citizens
includes an enhanced opportunity to alter political outcomes.134 A
minority group may not have the votes to elect a candidate directly,
but if the political process is open, the group may be able to influence
specific outcomes by deliberating with others on matters of political
importance. 135 In turn, members of the community may recognize
common interests they previously overlooked. 136 Eventually this may
weaken the barriers to coalition building that confront minority
groups. This may then lead to an end to the divisiveness of racial
politics. 137
Furthermore, an equal opportunity to engage in the process produces benefits for all citizens by affirming that the political system is
legitimate. Professor Abrams states that legitimacy means "those features that make [a government] acceptable to those who live under it,
and that make the laws enacted by it worthy of being followed." 138 A
tension is inherent in a republican system: the system understands all
citizens to be equal, but a comparatively small number of citizens actually makes the important government decisions. 13 9 To retain legitimacy, this system must preserve the "premise of equality." 140
Citizeris• abilities to participate in all phases of the political process
decrease this tension between representation and equality. Participation in the political process allows all those who do not exercise the
133. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 51-74 (1987) (contending that whites are
the primary beneficiaries of civil rights enforcement).
134. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) ("the power to influence the
political process is not limited to winning elections"); see also Alkalimat & Gills, Chicago Black Power v. Racism: Harold Washington Becomes Mayor, in THE NEW BLACK VOTE 53-180
(R. Bush ed. 1984) (demonstrating how control over political outcomes can be an inducement to
voter registration); Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the Distribution ofPublic Benefits in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 271-85 (identifying belief of black activists that
increased political participation can affect outcomes).
135. See, e.g., VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 183-208 (1973) (noting the
correlation between membership in private, voluntary organizations and political participation).
136. See, e.g., Bush, Oakland: Grassroots Organizing Against Reagan, in THE NEW BLACK
VOTE, supra note 134, at 342-48 (explaining how previously disaffected minority voters were
mobilized by the Peace and Justice Organization); Bush, Black Enfranchisement, Jesse Jackson,
and Beyond, in id. at 24-26 (explaining bow previously disaffected minority voters were mobilized by the People Organized for Welfare and Economic Reform and the candidacy of Harold
Washington).
137. ''There is even evidence, although tentative and anecdotal, that increased minority political participation is breaking down patterns of racial polarization and bloc voting." McDonald,
supra note 122, at 1278 n.166.
138. Abrams, supra note 110, at 478-79; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105
(1980) (noting that rights to participation in the political process are "critical to the functioning
of an open and effective democratic process").
139. "The tension between majority rule and minority representation defines a fundamental
dilemma of democratic political theory." Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional
Representation, 94 YALE L. REV. 163, 166 (1984).
140. Abrams, supra note 110, at 479-81.
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final decision to attempt to influence those who do. Thus, all citizens
benefit. 141
C.

Combining the Opportunity To Elect and the Opportunity To
Participate into an Overarching Theory

Thus far this Part has treated the opportunity to elect and the opportunity to participate in the political process separately. While
treating these prongs separately helps to identify the benefits associated with them, this section combines the prongs to identify an overarching goal for section 2. This section argues that the goal of section
2 is to increase civic inclusion in the entire political process by decreasing racial discrimination in the process.
According to Professor Pamela Karlan, combining the opportunity
to elect and the opportunity to participate produces an overarching
goal: "civic inclusion." 142 Civic inclusion means access to the broad
range of governmental processes from political meetings to election of
officials and effective representation by those officials. 143 The Supreme
Court has recognized this goal of civic inclusion on a number of occasions.144 Additionally, Karlan suggests that Congress, in amending
section 2, reaffirmed its commitment to civic inclusion as the goal of
section 2. 145
Civic inclusion combines the benefits produced by giving full
meaning to the opportunity to elect and participate. Thus, Professor
Karlan concludes that civic inclusion promotes "a sense of connectedness to the community ... ; greater readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence broader consent and legitimacy; and more
informed, equitable and intelligent decisionmaking." 146
Moreover, Congress recognized that a large barrier to civic inclusion is racial discrimination: both its lingering effects 147 and the pres141. See, e.g., Weale, Representation, Individualism, and Collectivism, 91 ETHICS 457, 463
(noting participation in the process by a group's members mitigates "the inevitable disappointments of policymaking"); Note, supra note 123, at 1825-26 (arguing that increased minority
participation in the legislative process will yield greater minority support for government action).
142. Karlan, supra note 118, at 179.
143. Karlan, supra note 118, at 180.
144. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd. per curiam sub nom. East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
145. Karlan, supra note 118, at 196-99. Karlan notes that a number of the Senate factors
point to civic inclusion as the goal of § 2. For example, the election of minority officials (the
seventh factor) and the responsiveness of officials to the. minority group (the first additional factor) both point to inclusion as the goal of§ 2. In addition, the first factor (a history of discrimination) and the fourth factor (whether minorities have been denied access to candidate slating)
both measure exclusion from the political process. See supra note 100 (listing the Senate factors).
146. Karlan, supra note 118, at 180.
147. Prior discrimination in the political process can have continuing effects by lowering
registration and turnout rates among minorities. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398,
1413-14 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. City Council of Chicago v. Ketchum, 471 U.S.
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ent effects of existing discrimination. 148 To attack discrimination,
Congress revised section 2 to prohibit not only discrimination by state
actors but also to prevent political processes from furthering the effects of private discrimination. 149 A number of the factors in the Senate Report focus on the pervasiveness of private racial discrimination
in the political process.1so
In sum, the goal of section 2 is to increase civic inclusion by decreasing the effects of racial discrimination in the political process.
This understanding of the goal of section 2 provides a touchstone for
determining whether a particular political practice or electoral structure violates the goals of section 2. Part III will use this understanding of section 2 to determine whether techniques used to elect singlemember offices and the structure of these offices can frustrate the goals
of section 2. If single-member offices hamper the achievement of civic
inclusion, then excluding single-member offices from section 2's coverage is unjustified.
III. APPLYING SECTION 2 TO SINGLE-MEMBER OFFICES
To begin this analysis, this Part addresses the preliminary question
of how the Gingles tripartite test applies to single-member offices. Section III.A argues that the tripartite test should not apply to a claim
that challenges both an election practice for a single-member office
and the structure of an office. Section III.A also argues that if the test
does apply, a challenge to a single-member office can satisfy the test.
Section III.B demonstrates how the combination of at-large elections
and concentration of power associated with single-member offices can
thwart the goals of section 2. This Part concludes single-member offices can diminish the equal opportunity of a minority group to elect
1135 (1985); United States v. Marengo County Commn., 731F.2d1546, 1568 (11th Cir.), appeal
dismissed & cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984). In addition, discrimination in educational and
economic opportunities can also diminish participation in the political process. See Marengo
County Commn., 731 F.2d at 1568; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207 n.114 (poor living
conditions caused by past discrimination depress minority political participation).
148. When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, Senator Javits remarked that the
purpose of the Act was "not only to correct an active history of discrimination ••• but also to
deal with the accumulation of discrimination." 111 CONG. REc. 8295 (1965). The Senate report
also noted "that voting practices and procedures that have discriminatory results perpetuate the
effects of past purposeful discrimination." SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 218.
149. See, e.g., Note, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: An Approach to the Results Test, 39
VAND. L. REv. 139, 172 (1986) ("Congress, therefore, revised section 2 to prohibit election
practices that accommodate or amplify the effect that private discrimination has in the voting
process.").
150. For a list of the Senate factors, see supra note 100. Factor 2 (racially polarized voting)
concentrates on the interplay between election practices and private racial discrimination by voters. Factor 4 (denial of access to slating procedures) also focuses on private racial discrimination. Similarly, factor 6 (racial campaign appeals) highlights the impact of private racial
discrimination on the political participation of minority groups.
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candidates of its choice and participate in the political process, and,
thus, these offices should be open to section 2 suits.
A. Answering the Preliminary Question: How Does the Tripartite
Test Apply to Single-Member Posts?
Courts have assumed that satisfying the Gingles tripartite test is a
prerequisite to a finding of vote dilution under section 2.151 Hence,
one might assume that satisfying the Gingles factors would be a prerequisite to a successful challenge to a single-member office. Advocates of the "share of" approach would quickly embrace this
interpretation because it may seem peculiarly difficult for plaintiffs
contesting elections for single-members offices to satisfy the first of the
Gingles factors: a showing of a geographically compact majority in a
single-member district. The remaining two Gingles factors, essentially
a showing of polarized voting, would not present unique problems for
plaintiffs alleging that an election practice for a single-member office
violated section 2. 152 Consequently, this section will focus on the impact of the first factor on single-member offices.
The first Gingles factor requires a minority group to show that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district. 153 Advocates of the "share of" approach
would argue that this prong bars any challenges to single-member offices because the minority group cannot constitute a majority in the
only district possible - the entire jurisdiction. 154 But this reasoning
151. In particular, courts have held that satisfying the first element of the tripartite test,
geographic compactness, is an essential condition of a § 2 challenge. See, e.g., McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851F.2d937, 942 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989) (using the
geographic compactness as a litmus test); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1199-204 (S.D.
Miss. 1987); Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 129 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (minority
group not numerous enough to be entitled to a majority black single-member district).
152. This is not to say that the measurement of polarized voting is uncontroversial, rather it
is to say that the techniques for measuring polarized voting would be the same for a multimember or single-member office. See generally Grofman, Migalski & Novielo, The "Totality of
Circumstances Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science
Perspective, 7 LAW & POLY. 199 (1985); Engstrom & McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote
Dilution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 URB. LAW. 369 (1985); Jacobs & O'Rourke, Racial Polarization in Vote Dilution Cases Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: The Impact a/Thornburg v. Gingles, 3 J.L. & POL. 295, 317-35 (1986).
While a majority of the court in Thornburg v. Gingles joined Justice Brennan's statement of
the legal test for polarized voting, only three other members of the court accepted his views on
whether the reasons underlying patterns of voting by race are a proper subject in assessing polarized voting. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61-74 (1986). For critiques of the Gingles
Court's approach to polarized voting, see Engstrom & McDonald, Definitions, Measurements,
and Statistics: Weeding the Thicket, 20 URB. LAW. 175 (1988); Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra, at
347-53; Wildger, Adding Thornburg to the Thicket: The Ecological Fallacy and Parameter Control in Vote Dilution Cases, 20 URB. LAW. 155 (1988).
·
153. For a review of the Gingles factors, see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
154. For example, a "share of" advocate would argue that if 40% of a town's voters are
black, they cannot compriSe a majority in the only district relevant for a mayor's election - the
entire town.
·
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can be rebutted in two ways. First, the Gingles opinion suggests possible limits on the reach of its tripartite test. And second, commentators
have argued persuasively that the first prong of the test unjustifiably
restricts section 2 challenges.
The tripartite test may not apply to single-member offices because
of limiting language in the Gingles opinion. The Court limited the
potential application of the tripartite test in two respects. The Court
noted that it was not dealing with or developing standards for a claim
"brought by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that
the use of a multi-member district impairs its ability to influence elections. "155 This caveat leaves undeveloped the standards applicable to
a single-member office since a challenge to a single-member office
would probably involve a minority group alleging diminished opportunity to influence as well as elect. ls6
In addition, the Court reserved judgment on whether the standards
developed for a multi-member vote dilution claim in Gingles would
apply "to other sorts of vote dilution claims." 157 Plaintiffs challenging
a single-member office would argue that an at-large election for the
office dilutes their voting strength and the structure of the office diminishes their ability to participate in the political process. This would be
a hybrid vote dilution-opportunity to influence claim. This may fall
under the "other sorts of vote dilution claims" to which the tripartite
test may not apply.
At minimum, the limits in the Court's opinion and its focus on
elections suggest that the tripartite test would be restricted to vote dilution claims. Thus, if a plaintiff brought a claim of candidate diminution or disenfranchisement, satisfying the tripartite test should not be a
prerequisite to a challenge. For example, if the plaintiff challenged a
single-member office, like a mayor, for withholding candidate registration information, the plaintiff should not have to show that he was a
member of a group that could form a majority in a single-member
district. 158
In addition, the first element of the tripartite test unjustifiably restricts section 2 challenges because it focuses exclusively on the oppor155. Gingles, 418 U.S. at 46-47 n.12.
156. The Court would probably recognize an ability-to-influence claim even if the plaintiffs
could not comprise a majority in a single-member district. For a fuller discussion see Karlan,
supra note 118, at 206 n.129 ("it seems likely that the Supreme Court would hold 'influence'
claims to be cognizable under Section 2"). Lower courts have recognized ability-to-influence
claims in cases where the minority was not compact enough to constitute a majority. See, e.g.,
East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988) (recognizing an
influence claim even when the minority could not constitute a majority in a single-member
district).
157. 478 U.S. at 47 n.12.
158. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (no
showing of a compact majority required in a challenge to a mayor's actions).
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tunity to elect, ignoring the opportunity to participate. 159 If a singlemember officeholder diminishes the equal opportunity of minority citizens to participate in the political process, this should be remediable
whether the minority group comprises 60 percent of the jurisdiction or
20 percent. After all, if the minority group comprised 60 percent of
the electorate it could protect itself in the political process by voting
the official out of office. In contrast, a minority group comprising 20
percent of the electorate needs the protection of section 2.
Therefore, this Note concludes that the tripartite test shoul!i not
apply to single-member offices. Instead, a court should draw on the
factors outlined in the Senate Report and tailor the factors to singlemember offices. Courts should continue to use polarization as a prerequisite for a section 2 violation because it highlights a breakdown in
the coalition-building process normally found in politics. 160 In addition, courts should focus on the Senate factors that indicate an inequality in the opportunities to participate in the political process. 161
But suppose that the tripartite test does apply to a vote dilution
challenge to single-member offices: would this bar challenges to single-member offices? The answer is no, according to the Stallings and
Dillard courts. In Stallings, for example, blacks comprised 15.3 percent of the voting age population of the county.162 If the single-member county commissioner was to remain single-member, blacks could
not be a majority in the only district possible: the entire county. But
because the court was willing to consider expanding the county commission from one member to three or five members, the plaintiffs, who
showed they were a majority in one of the districts, were able to challenge the single-member office.163
The Dillard court displayed a similar attitude but did not have to
face the question of dividing the county into new districts because the
parties had already created them. In Dillard, blacks constituted 15.9
percent of the voting age population of Calhoun County. 164 If the
159. For criticisms of the geographic compactness requirement, see Karlan, supra note 118,
at 180-82, 199-205; Abrams, supra note 110, at 465-69.
160. See supra notes 107-09, 115-16 and accompanying text on polarized voting.
161. For challenges to single-member offices, the Senate factor dealing with the responsiveness of elected officials to a minority group would be important. See supra note 100. A court
should examine the responsiveness not only of elected officials to a minority group but also to the
group's elected representatives. In addition, the presence of discrimination in the political process would indicate an unequal opportunity to participate. See supra note 100; Abrams, supra
note 110, at 510-13.
162. City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936
(1988).
163. 829 F.2d at 1563. The difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that the court must
have a proposed districting scheme in mind when it determines whether the minority group can
comprise a majority in a district. For a discussion of this problem, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 88-92 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 247 (11th Cir. 1987).
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court had held that the chairperson of the county commission had to
remain at-large, then the black voters could never have comprised a
majority in the county. But because the court agreed to have the position of chairperson rotate among the five district commissioners,
blacks could comprise a majority in one of the districts, and thus the
office was open to challenge.16s
From the Dillard court's approach, one can see how minority voters could meet the tripartite test for a challenge to an at-large city
council president's office, for example. 166 Although it is clear how this
approach would apply to a council president's office, it is less obvious
how a challenge to a mayor's office would be acceptable under this
approach. In a town comprised of 30 percent minority voters, they
could not constitute a majority in the only relevant district, the whole
town. This assumes, however, that the mayor's office must remain as
presently constituted. If, instead, the office could be shared or the
mayor-council form of government changed to a city commission with
a rotating chairperson, 167 the jurisdiction would be effectively subdivided into more than one district, and minority voters could satisfy the
first Gingles factor.
B. Determining How Single-Member Offices Violate the Goals of the
Voting Rights Act

Section III.A argued that satisfying the Gingles tripartite test
should not be a prerequisite for challenging a single-member office
under section 2. Section III.A also demonstrated that if the tripartite
test is a prerequisite, a section 2 challenge to a single-member office
could satisfy the test's requirements. Section III.B will show how single-member offices may actually violate the goals of section 2. As section II.C. argued, the opportunity to elect and to participate combine
to form an overarching goal of civic inclusion. While the opportunity
to elect and participate should be thought of as a package, this section
will discuss them separately for two reasons. The first is clarity. The
second reason is to follow courts who frequently analyze the prongs
separately. Yet when a violation of section 2 is associated with a single-member office, this violation diminishes both the opportunity to
elect and the opportunity to participate. Thus, the violation hampers
civic inclusion.
165. 831 F.2d at 253.
166. Suppose white voters comprise 70% of the population and minorities comprise 30%,
with whites a majority in seven of the city districts and blacks a majority in the other three.
Suppose that the council consists of ten members chosen by district and the council president
chosen at large. If the council president must remain an at-large jurisdiction-wide office, minorities could not comprise a majority in the entire city. But ifthe council presidency can be rotated
among the council members, as in Dillard, then blacks do comprise a majority in three of the
districts and the at-large election for the office could be challenged.
167. See infra notes 245-46.
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As this Note has suggested, single-member offices can violate section 2 in ways similar to multi-member offices and in ways unique to
single-member offices. 168 As an example of the former, suppose a jurisdiction imposes a primary runoff requirement in an election for an
office. 16 9 This requirement can dilute minority voting strength
whether the election is for a single- or multi-member office.17° Similarly, if the holder of either type of office is unresponsive to his minority constituents, this diminishes equal opportunity to participate in the
political process. 171 Because these cases could be addressed under the
traditional analysis of electoral discrimination, 172 this section will not
focus on single-member violations that resemble those caused by
multi-member offices.
Instead, this section focuses on violations of section 2 peculiar to
single-member offices which require an updated analysis. Specifically,
one peculiar violation occurs when a single-member office combines
selection by at-large election with a concentration of power that lessens the opportunity of minority voters or their elected officials to participate in the political process. In this way, both the opportunity to
elect and to participate are diminished, thwarting civic inclusion.168. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
169. Under a run-off requirement, candidates must obtain an absolute majority of the votes
to win, rather than a plurality. If no candidate obtains a majority, a run-off election is required
between the two top vote-getters. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note I, at 6.
170. Chandler Davidson explains how a runoff requirement can dilute minority voting
strength:
The mandatory runoff precludes the possibility that a minority candidate will win office with
a mere plurality if the white vote splits among several other candidates. In that situation,
the minority candidate is forced into a runoff against a single white, behind whom the white
voters can rally to produce a majority.
Id. The discriminatory impact of run-off requirements has been recognized in a variety of contexts and by a variety of authors. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159,
167 (1983); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Registration Barriers, supra note
35; McDonald, The Majority Vote Requirement: Its Use and Abuse in the South, 11 URB. LAW.
429 (1985); Note, Assessing the Legality of Runoff Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 876 (1986); Note, The Primary Runoff: Racism's Reprieve?, 65 N.C. L. REV.
359 (1987); Note, RunoffPrimaries: Is There a Discriminatory Result?, 2 J.L. & POL. 369 (1985).
But two courts have denied that run-off requirements for single-member offices dilute minority voting strength. See Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1021 (1986); Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), affd. in
part & revd. in part, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989), affd., 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990). While the
Eighth Circuit recognized that a majority vote primary run-off could dilute minority voting
strength, the court did not specifically address the impact of the run-off on single-member offices.
Cf. Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.22 (M.D. Ala.
1989).
Both Butts and Whitfield, at the district court level, are incorrectly decided because they fail
to recognize that a run-off requirement dilutes minority voting strength regardless of whether the
underlying office being chosen is single- or multi-member. For a hypothetical example of vote
dilution caused by a run-off for a single-member office, see Karlan, supra note 118, at 187 n.54.
171. The Senate Report suggests that unresponsiveness is one indicator of unequal access to
the political process. See supra note iOO; see also Abrams, supra note 110, at 510.
172. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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1. Diminishing an Equal Opportunity To Elect
This section will demonstrate how single-member offices can produce an unequal opportunity to elect a candidate of a minority group's
choice. Vote dilution produced by at-large elections for single-member offices, combined with the lingering animosity to minority candidates, causes this inequality.
The Senate Report on the 1982 amendments to the Act states: "In
the context of . . . racial bloc voting, and other factors, a particular
election method can deny minority voters equal opportunity to participate meaningfully in elections." 173 An analysis of at-large election
systems will demonstrate how they dilute minority access to the political process in exactly the way Congress intended to prohibit. 174 Single-member offices are generally chosen at large because the
jurisdiction as a whole is voting to fill one office. The at-large nature
of single-member offices poses a significant barrier to a minority
group's equal opportunity to elect.11s
Although at-large systems are not per se unconstitutional, 176 and
may help minority groups in some situations, 177 the Court "has long
recognized that ... at-large voting schemes may 'operate to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting
population.' " 178 Critics of at-large systems argue that they were often
173. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 211.
174. Indeed, the Senate Report specifically mentions at-large elections. See, e.g., SENATll
REPORT, supra note 4, at 207 (in discussing the diluting effects of election systems, the Report
notes "Whitcomb, White, Zimmer, and their progeny dealt with electoral system features such as
at-large elections."); Note, At-Large Elections and Vote Dilution: An Empirical Study, 19 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 1221 (1986) (arguing that the results test was designed to attack the vote
dilution caused by at-large elections).
175. This Note has observed, supra note 84 and accompanying text, that an office does not
have to be elected at large to be single-member. However, the courts seem to treat at-large,
jurisdiction-wide elections as a key component of single-member offices. Consequently, discus·
sion of the at-large character of these offices is appropriate.
176. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
177. In theory, minority voters may benefit from at-large elections because they will hold the
"swing" votes. Thus in a tight race between two candidates, the minority voters can determine
the outcome by swinging their votes to one candidate. The swing vote theory, however, has a
number of defects. First, the margin between the two candidates may be so great that the minority vote lacks influence. Second, the winning candidate may not be able to assess his level of
minority support. Third, winning candidates do not always pay attention to minority groups
after the election because the candidates are also in debt to white voters, voters whose interests
may conflict with the minority's interest. See Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 9-10. Finally, minority groups often prefer to have
at least one candidate of their choice in an election, rather than the opportunity to hold the
balance of power in a number of elections. See L. HARRIS & AssoCIATES, A STUDY OF RACIAL
ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND TENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES Vol. I (Jan. 11, 1989) (finding,
by a 91 percent majority, that blacks would prefers to have more blacks nominated to high office
rather than remaining the swing votes).
178. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (quoting Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 88 (1986) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965))).
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adopted to dilute minority voting strength. 179 At-large elections may
diminish the equal opportunity to elect in two ways. First, at-large
elections actually dilute minority voting strength by submerging minority voters in majority districts. Second, at-large elections decrease
the ability of minority citizens and their candidates to participate in
pre-election politics.
The Court, in Gingles, explained how an at-large system dilutes
minority voting strength. "The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority by virtue of its numerical
superiority will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters." 180
Racial bloc voting, in the context of an at-large system, allows a white
majority to use the electoral structure to dilute minority voting
strength. 181 A number of studies demonstrate the discriminatory effects of at-large voting schemes.18z The Stallings court recognized the
evils of an at-large office in the single-member office challenged in the
case. The court linked the at-large character of the office to the office
in Gingles. 183
Critics of the view that the at-large character of single-member offices diminishes the equal opportunity to elect might respond that
black candidates and black voters are unsuccessful simply because
they are affiliated with the wrong political party. 184 Political affilia179. See, e.g., Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A
Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra
note 1, at 67-71; Note, The Constitutional Significance of the Discriminatory Effects ofAt-Large
Elections, 91 YALE L.J. 974, 979 n.25 (1982). The Stallings court found that the at-large, single
member commission was adopted for discriminatory purposes. City of Carrollton Branch of
NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Duncan v.
City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1986). Whether or not an at-large
system was adopted for a discriminatory purpose may be considered under the totality of the
circumstances test, but intent is not necessary for a violation of§ 2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44.
180. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.
181. Consider a town with a voting age population of 10,000, governed by a town council of
ten members, all elected at large. Seventy percent of the voters are white, while the remaining 30
percent are members of protected minority groups under the Voting Rights Act. Suppose there
is strong racial bloc voting, i.e., the whites vote as a group and the minority votes as a group for
their preferred candidates and there is little crossover voting. Under this electoral system, whites
could elect ten candidates while the minority group would elect none. This demonstrates the
theoretical basis of dilution the court had in mind in Gingles.
182. See Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra
note 1, at 65-81; Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects ofAt-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 85, 85 (1979); Note, supra note 174.
183. -829 F.2d at 1549.
184. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), black ghetto residents in Indianapolis,
Indiana argued that their votes were being diluted by an at-large voting system for the state
legislature. The Court found that the ghetto area voted Democratic, but in four of five elections
from 1960 to 1968, Republicans carried the district. When the Democrats carried the district in
1964, ghetto area senators and representatives were elected. The Court concluded:
·
[T]he failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges
more as a function oflosing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting
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tion, however, plays a diminished role in local elections because the
majority are nonpartisan. 185 In addition, a critic might argue that an
election is a numbers game lost by minority voters simply because
white voters outnumber minority voters. After all, a critic might argue, if a town consisted of 70 percent Republicans and 30 percent
Democrats, no one would have a legitimate complaint if the Democrats never elected a mayor; they simply lacked the numbers. 186 Similarly, why should the Voting Rights Act be implicated when, in a town
that has 70 percent white voters and 30 percent minorities, the minority group never elects a mayor? Again, they simply lacked the
numbers.
The response to this objection is that race is significantly different
from political affiliation. In the political party hypothetical, the Democrats' losses do not cause concern because the Court assumes that the
normal processes of political give-and-take enable the political minority to influence the process even though they may not be able to elect a
candidate directly. 187 In contrast, this influence does not operate in
jurisdictions with a history of discrimination and of racially polarized
voting. 188 Often the present effects of past discrimination prevent a
minority group from combining with majority voters to protect the
group's interests. 189
In addition a critic may argue that relying on the at-large character
of elections for single-member offices is inappropriate because the atpower of ghetto residents may have been "cancelled out" as the District Court held, but this
seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.
Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring in part) (arguing that political affiliation should be taken into account). The district court in Gingles did take
political affiliation into account, but still concluded that race rather than political affiliation
played a far larger role in explaining voting patterns. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 365
(E.D.N.C. 1984).
185. See 49 MUN. Y.B. 181 (1982) (70.2% of municipal elections are nonpartisan).
186. If the Republicans in the hypothetical had employed techniques that diluted Democratic voting strength, however, a court might hold that these techniques violated the Equal
Protection clause. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1986).
187. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (the Court, using this reasoning, refused to find an equal
protection violation merely because an apportionment scheme made it difficult for Democrats to
elect representatives of their choice.).
188. See Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88; see also Abrams, supra note 110, at 506 ("The
present effects of past discrimination prevent [black voters] from influencing or coalescing with
white voters in ways that will preserve their voice in the politics of the district."); Note, Geometry
and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 203 (1984)
("The pluralist model of shifting alliances and coalitions has never, in fact, applied to blacks in
American politics.") (footnote omitted).
189. Abrams, supra note 110, at 506. Professor Abrams suggests this breakdown occurs
because "(t]he lingering effects of past discrimination can make white voters resistant or insensitive to minority perspectives, and can make minority voters reluctant to exchange views with
others they may perceive as hostile or indifferent to their interests." Id. at 506 n.287; see also
Guinier, supra note 124, at 424 n.138 ("Because of extreme racial polarization within the electorate, the pluralist model does not work for blacks. The possibility of forming coalitions with likeminded allies to aggregate minority political power into an electable majority fails where mem·
bers of the majority consistently refuse to vote for minority sponsored candidates.").
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large cases focus on multi-member bodies, while single-member offices
involve one individual. The critic might add, the premise of a challenge to an at-large election system is that an alternative exists. Usually the alternative is election by districts created to give minority
voters an equal opportunity to elect a representative. 19° But in the
case of single-member offices, according to the "share of" approach,
no alternative to at-large election exists because there is only one district (the entire jurisdiction) and it cannot be divided. For example,
how could the at-larg~, city-wide election of a mayor be changed?
This objection, however, is flawed because it assumes that the jurisdictional lines must remain the same. 191 If the boundaries were challenged and changed, it may be possible to create a black majority
voting district. 192
Also, this critique assumes that the office deemed single-member
must remain as it is presently constituted. That is, the "share of"
approach assumes that a city council president must continue to be
held by one person with the same powers originally invested in the
office or that a mayor's office must be held by a single person with all
the powers remaining in that office. This assumption, however, is not
grounded on the Voting Rights Act or case law. As Part IV will argue
and a number of cases have already demonstrated, a court has the
power to modify the structure, as well as the power, of a single-member office. If a court restructures a single-member post, then a racial
minority group can comprise a majority in one or more districts, thus
satisfying even the requirements of the "share of" approach.193
At-large elections for single-member offices, besides diluting minority voting strength, also decrease the ability of minority citizens
and their candidates to participate in the pre-election political process.
Because at-large elections require an appeal to the entire electorate
rather than a single district, "such elections require greater financial
190. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) (noting that single-member districts
are the preferred remedy in place of multi-member districts); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 765-70 (1973).
191. The Siege/man court does recognize this assumption. "This assumes, of course, that the
boundaries in place are a given." Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F.
Supp. 5ll, 519 n.20 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
192. "If those boundaries are challenged, however, the situation changes. By redrawing the
city's external boundaries, it would in some cases be theoretically possible to create a black majority voting jurisdiction." Siege/man, 714 F. Supp. at 519 n.20. Because the chances of this
kind of boundary change are minimal, this Note will not focus on that approach to single-member offices.
193. For example, in Dillard plaintiffs challenged a proposed county commission chairperson, an office traditionally held by one person and elected at large. The court suggested that this
office be rotated among the five commission members chosen by district. Dillard v. Crenshaw
County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987). Since minority voters would comprise a majority in
one of the districts, their representative would have one opportunity out of five to serve as
chairperson. 831 F.2d at 248. In this way, an office and its powers traditionally held by one
person were now, in effect, shared by five people. See also McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F.
Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (doubling size of city council).
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resources and put a premium on the endorsement of civic associations
and, most important, local newspapers." 19 4 Because these organizations are generally controlled by the white majority, blacks frequently
are unable to obtain the support necessary for success in a city or
county wide race. Black candidates who have garnered the support of
the "establishment" are rarely "the most effective advocates of black
interests." 195 Similarly, an at-large electoral system gives political parties "exceptional power over aspirants and elected officials because of
the insurmountable odds confronting an unattached candidate." 196
The elected official will likely be in debt to a political party for his
nomination and election. This indebtedness limits his independence.
An official with majority support, especially white majority support in
a racially polarized town, risks losing that backing if he embraces "minority proposals which are at war with the majority view on the same
question." 197
These characteristics of at-large elections often combine with lingering animosity to minority candidates to produce an inequality in
the opportunity to elect. 198 Surveys indicate that the higher the office
for which a qualified black candidate is running, the less likely white
citizens are to vote for the candidate. 199 This makes it particularly
difficult for black candidates to be successful in elections for singlemember offices because these offices are typically greater in status than
multi-member offices in a jurisdiction. The election of minority candidates in a jurisdiction is relevant to the section 2 inquiry. 200 The record on the election of black candidates to single-member posts, such as
194. Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88; see also United States v. Dallas County Commn.,
850 F.2d 1433, 1439 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting, in the context of at-large election, that "Dallas
County's black citizens have a more difficult time garnering political strength than whites because of insurmountable social and economic barriers which separate the races."); Butts v. City
of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 156 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) (noting the
impact on black candidates of the expense of running citywide in New York City in part because
of the need for media coverage).
195. Berry & Dye, supra note 182, at 88. This practice is known as co-opting. See Davidson
& Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination ofHistorical
and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 1, at 79.
196. Washington, Does The Constitution Guarantee Fair and Effective Representation to All
Interest Groups Making Up the Electorate, 17 How. L.J. 91, 107 (1971).
197. Washington, supra note 196, at 108.
198. See, e.g., L. CoLE, supra note 121, at 114 & 233 (1976) (suggesting that many white
citizens and officials believe that black officials work to benefit black citizens without engaging in
dialogue with all interest groups); Weinraub, Jackson Intends to Keep Bid Alive, N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1988, at 20, col. 6 (Jesse Jackson argues that his candidacy is treated with disrespect); J.
WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDER: BLACK/WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
SINCE EMANCIPATION (1986) (noting the legacy of Reconstruction era stereotypes). Scholars
argue that these attitudes may be based on Reconstruction Era fears of "Negro rule." Kennedy,
Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 521, 523-24 (1989).
199. Focus Magazine, Trendletter 2 (1988) (supplement to Vol. 16, No. 4) (reporting results
of 1987 Joint Center for Political Studies Gallup Survey).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982).
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mayors, demonstrates a diminished level of participation.201
2. Diminishing an Equal Opportunity To Participate

Single-member offices, beside creating an inequality in the opportunity to elect, can also diminish a minority group's equal opportunity to
participate in the political process. A court should consider City of
Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings 202 and Dillard v. Crenshaw County 203 as two paradigms for determining whether a singlemember office unlawfully diminishes the equal opportunity to participate in the political process. The common denominator of these violations is a concentration of power in a single-member office. This
concentrated power can either directly diminish the opportunity of minority citizens to take part in the political process or indirectly diminish citizens' opportunity by diluting the influence of their elected
representatives. 204
In Stallings, a single county commissioner, elected at large, made
all the government decisions for his county. Because the at-large elec201. See, e.g., Focus Magazine, Joint Center for Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, at 2 (Apr.
1988). "Blacks with political aspirations have begun to saturate the majority-black jurisdictions,
but they still have a difficult time winning in places where the majority of the electorate is white."
Id.; Smothers, Why the Higher Rungs of Power Elude Black Politicians, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1989, § 4 at 4, col. 1; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in Minority Vote Dilution,
supra note 1, at 14 (noting that when a black candidate is elected mayor in Alabama, the town is
usually small and blacks usually comprise an overwhelming percentage of the population).
202. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988). See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case.
203. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case.
204. This approach might be termed "concentration of power'' analysis. To this section's
approach, contrast United States v. Marengo County, 643 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Ala. 1986), affd.
sub nom. Clark v. Marengo County, 811 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1987). This case raises the issue of
whether courts should question concentration of power. The Marengo County court suggests
that if the chairpersons were distinct from other members of the entities, then that might be a
"persuasive justification" for allowing at-large chairpersons. 643 F. Supp. at 235. In contrast,
this section suggests that if the chairpersons were distinct in the power they exercised, then they
would be single-member offices and subject to this Note's analysis. Under this Note's approach,
the chairpersons could violate the Dillard rationale because they would possess the power to
diminish the influence of black elected officials chosen by district.
To Marengo County compare United States v. Dallas County Commn., 661 F. Supp. 955
(S.D. Ala. 1987), also authored by Judge Hand. There the court approved a plan that would
provide for a revamped county commission consisting of four commissioners chosen by district,
but would retain the probate judge of the county as the at-large chairperson of the commission.
661 F. Supp. at 956-57. The government challenged this plan, arguing that it would not completely cure the violation because the probate judge position would be beyond the reach of black
voters. Yet the government apparently conceded that this single-person office was less subject to
challenge "because the duties of this single-person office are uniquely executive-judicial." 661 F.
Supp. at 957.
Although the court's description of the judge's actual powers as chairperson are sparse, the
"chair'' presumably exercises greater powers than other members of the commission. Consequently, this office would be considered single-member under this Note's analysis and subject to
challenge.
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tion for the commissioner in conjunction with racially polarized voting
diluted black voting strength, blacks could not directly elect a representative.205 More importantly, concentrating all the government
power in one official limited the opportunity of black citizens to participate in the political process. If the single commissioner did not
listen to the concerns of black citizens, they had no other outlet to
participate in their county's political process.206
Although few governments are organized like the single county
commission in Stallings, 207 the case still teaches an important lesson.
A court should be on guard against a situation where power is concentrated, either by law or by practice, in the hands of a single-member
officeholder, and this power threatens the opportunity of minority citizens to engage in the political process.
Dillard 208 provides the second paradigm for understanding how
concentrated power in a single-member office can diminish the equal
opportunity to participate. In Dillard, the court rejected the proposed
position of county chairperson elected at large because the court
feared that excessive power would gravitate to the chairperson.209 In
turn, this power could be used to diminish the opportunity for black
elected officials to participate in government.21o
One can imagine a similar process in which power in a town gravitates to the mayor's office. For instance, a mayor may exercise his
authority with little legislative oversight. When the city council does
meet, it rubberstamps the mayor's decisions despite objections from
beleaguered minority representatives on the council. Moreover, the
mayor and the majority white elected councilmembers exclude minority elected councilmembers from important government decisions. 211
These decisions frequently disadvantage the minority community. For
instance, their neighborhoods receive less than a proportionate share
of spending. 212
205. 829 F.2d at 1551-58.
206. "The Carroll County Commissioner is the entire governing body for the county." Included among his powers was the ability to "appoint all minor officials of the county, whose
election or appointment is not otherwise fixed by law." 829 F.2d at 1551 n.7. In addition, because the county commissioner was the sole legislative authority in the county, he could pass
county ordinances on his own motion. Act of Dec. 13, 1982, No. 485 § 11, 1983 Ga. Laws 4656,
4660.
207. Only 24 or so counties out of 159 within the State of Georgia have authorized the singlecommissioner form of government. Brief for Respondents opposing petition for certiorari, at 12.
208. 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987).
209. 831 F.2d at 252.
210. 831 F.2d at 253.
211. See, e.g., Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. La. 1983) (all black legislators
excluded from a secret meeting on a redistricting proposal held in the basement of the Senate
chambers); see also H. BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE 162 (1982)
(when the nine-member Richmond, Virginia city council decided to annex areas occupied primarily by whites, the three black council members were excluded from the deliberations).
212. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1984) (court finds roads were unpaved as
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Section 2 logically should reach this process known as "legislative
exclusion. " 2 13 If minority citizens finally gain the equal opportunity
to elect officials of their choice, this achievement should not be nullified by denying their representatives an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
Thus, single-member offices can cause a violation of section 2 that
is unique to these offices, a violation that produces an inequality in
both the opportunity to elect and the opportunity to participate in the
political process. This unique type of violation thwarts section 2's goal
of increasing civic inclusion in the political process by decreasing the
effects of discrimination. Therefore, single-member offices should be
open to challenge under section 2. Part IV develops guidelines for
remedying violations of section 2 caused by single-member offices.
IV.

REMEDYING SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS CAUSED BY SINGLEMEMBER OFFICES

This Part begins by outlining the powers of a federal court to remedy violations of section 2. Although the defendant jurisdiction has
the first opportunity to propose a cure, section IV.A demonstrates that
the court retains broad remedial powers to ensure that a violation is
completely cured. Section IV.B develops a two-step approach to remedying violations caused by single-member offices. This approach recognizes that violations can be similar to those caused by multi-member
offices or peculiar to single-member offices. Section IV.C tailors the
remedies to different levels of government and different types of government offices.
A.

General Remedial Powers Under the Act

Once a violation of section 2 is established, a district court must
the defendant jurisdiction the first opportunity to develop satisfactory remedies. 214 This principle is constrained, however, by the
Senate Report's admonition that a court addressing a section 2 violation "should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the
relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens
to participate and to elect candidates of their choice."215 The Supreme
~fford

soon as they reached the black community); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), affd. on rehg., 461F.2d1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (disparity in city services provided to blacks
violates the fourteenth amendment).
213. See Karlan, supra note 118, at 237-39.
214. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-43 (1982) (per curiam); McDaniel v.
Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1981); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964); Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985); Ortiz,
Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J.L. &
POL. 653 (1988).
,
.
215. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208.
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Court has noted that a district court has broad remedial powers when
curing discrimination:
A district court has "not merely the power but the duty to render a
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable remedies. 2 16

Thus, a court faced with a violation must ensure that any proposed
remedy completely cures a violation.21 7

B. A Two-Step Approach to Remedying Violations of the Act
Caused by Single-Member Offices
"The basic principle of equity that the remedy fashioned must be
commensurate with the right that has been violated" establishes the
guideline for curing a section 2 violation. 218 To fulfill this requirement, one must recall how single-member offices violate section 2. A
single-member office can violate the Act in two different ways. One
type of violation, such as a discriminatory slating process or a majority
vote runoff primary, is not peculiar to the nature of a single-member
office.219 In Stallings and Dillard, by contrast, at-large elections combined with concentrated power to cause a section 2 violation unique to
single-member offices. Because single-member offices can violate the
Act in two different ways, a variety of remedies are necessary.
A court should take a two-step approach to curing violations of
section 2 caused by single-member offices. First, a court should consider remedies that enhance political participation without requiring a
restructuring of government. These remedies would be implemented
with traditional equitable devices such as injunctions and declaratory
judgments. For example, a court might cure a discriminatory slating
process for a single-member office by enjoining the process and ordering slating open to all interested parties. 220 Remedies under the first
step would be particularly appropriate to cure misconduct by a singlemember officeholder that is an isolated violation rather than part of a
216. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-84 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1; 15 (1971)); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (embracing broad
remedial powers for federal courts to cure constitutional violations involving discrimination, including the power to order a school board to raise taxes to fund a desegregation plan).
217. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208. A court "cannot authorize [a refuedy] that
will not with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation." Dillard v. Crenshaw County,
831 F.2d 246, 252 (11th Cir. 1987).
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208.
219. See supra notes 38 and 168-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of these devices.
220. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (affirming the district court's grant
of a declaratory judgment against discriminatory election practices and remanding for further
consideration of remedies).
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pattern of violations by the officeholder. If a mayor, for instance, refused to distribute election materials to minority candidates, a court
could enjoin the practice and order the mayor to distribute the materials to any interested candidates. 221
A second step would be necessary when the violation was peculiar
to the powers of a single-member office and part of a pattern of violations that could not appropriately be cured by simply enjoining a practice. This remedy is a restructuring of the role of a single-member
office in a government. Restructuring entails a parceling out of political power to diminish the concentration of power in the single-member office. For example, a single-member commission might be
expanded to a multi-member commission as in Stallings. 222 In the alternative, the court might order that the chair position of a commission be rotated among the commissioners, rather than be held by one
individual as in Dillard. 223 Or a court might parcel out the power of a
mayor's office by creating an additional office to share power, such as a
vice-mayor, filled by councilmembers on a rotating basis. 224 Once this
remedial approach to single-member offices is established, one must
determine which single-member posts in a state are open to challenge.
C. Determining Which Single-Member Offices Are
Open to Challenge
The "share of" approach holds that any office that qualifies as single-member is exempt from challenge. 225 The Dillard court, with its
emphasis on function, adopted a narrower definition of single-member
offices than the "share of" approach. The Dillard court considers
only nonlegislative functionaries to be single-member offices. 226 Despite the Dillard court's narrower approach to defining single-member
offices, both it and the "share of" approach presume that some singlemember offices are exempt from challenge.
This Note, in contrast, presumes that all single-member offices in a
221. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (The
mayor intentionally discriminated against black candidates by withholding candidacy requirement information from them. The proper remedy was to enjoin the town to certify blacks as duly
elected members of town co1;1ncil.).
222. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1563 (11th Cir.
1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936
(1988); see also McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. III. 1987) (doubling size of
city council), appeal dismissed, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1987).
223. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Warren v.
-'city of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1054, 1059 (M.D. Fla. 1988), affd., 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir.
1989) (city agrees to allow any councilperson, not just those elected at-large, to serve as chairman
and chairman pro-tem of the city council).
224. See Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1545 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
225. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
226. Examples include tax collectors, sheriffs, and probate judges. 831 F.2d at 251.
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state or political subdivision are open to challenge because these offices
can thwart the goals of section 2. The Dillard court noted:
Once a post is opened to the electorate, and if it is shown that the context
of that election creates a discriminatory but corrigible election practice,
it must be open in a way that allows racial groups to participate
equally.221

If a plaintiff challenges a particular single-member office, the plaintiff
must, of course, show how it violates the Act. If the plaintiff meets
this burden, the defendant cannot escape the challenge simply by
claiming an exemption as· a single-member office. Instead, the defendant must rebut the charged violation of the Act. This Note recognizes, however, that different levels of government and different types
of offices will vary in their susceptibility to successful challenge. Consequently, this section examines how the remedial approach applies to
different levels of government and types of offices.
1. State Offices
Congress designed section 2 to cover situations "where racial politics do dominate the political process." 228 While single-member offices
elected statewide, like a governor, certainly have the potential to engage in a pattern of abuse peculiar to the power of these offices, discriminatory actions by these officers are more likely to be isolated
events. This may be explained by the decline in the negative effects of
racial politics for statewide offices. 229 The recent election of Douglas
Wilder as governor of Virginia suggests that race may be playing less
of a role in statewide elections. 230 In addition, evidence suggests that
many Southern senators are becoming responsive to their black con227. 831 F.2d at 251.
228. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 211.
229. The negative effects of racial politics may be declining on the state level for two reasons.
For one, progressive governors are attacking discrimination to enhance the image of their states
and the productivity of their citizens. See Winbush, Mississippi ~ises Again, TIME, Nov. 16,
1987, at 32 (noting the election of young progressive governors in both Louisiana and Mississippi: Governor Mabus leads "an awakening movement to free Mississippi from its long-standing image of lethargy and backwardness"); Smothes, 3 Southern States Seek Progress Together.
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (governors of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi
meet to coordinate efforts to improve conditions in one of nation's poorest areas); Civil Rights
Caravan to Mark Deaths, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18, col. 4 (Governor Mabus states:
"Today, once more, the officials of Mississippi are standing in the schoolhouse door, but this time
we are standing in that door to open it wider and to make sure that everybody gets in ••••").
Second, as minority groups begin to participate fully in the political systems, candidates realize
they must court these potential voters. See, e.g., Barone, Civil Rights: An American Revolution,
Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1987, at Al7, col. 1 (Mississippi has "just conducted a governor's race in
which evidence of racism seems to have been entirely absent and in which every serious candidate has been striving to win blacks' vote.").
230. Oreskes, First Black Governor If Recount Upholds Vote, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at
Al, col. 1 (noting the success of Douglas Wilder). But cf. Oreskes, Joy of Democrats Diluted in
Virginia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (noting that Wilder received a lesser percentage
of votes.than other successful candidates on his ticket, and concluding that racial considerations
explain the difference).
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stituents. For example, concern for their black constituencies motivated Southern Democratic senators to vote against the nomination of
Robert Bork. 231 Anecdotal evidence similarly suggests that responsiveness by state officials to black voters is improving. 232 Yet, singlemember state officeholders may still engage in electoral discrimination. For example, in Major v. Treen, 233 the governor of Louisiana, in
concert with the state legislature, devised a racial gerrymander of the
state's congressional districts. 234
Under this Note's approach to remedies, restructuring of the state
single-member office in Major would not be the appropriate remedy.
In fact, restructuring would probably rarely be appropriate at the state
level when section 2 violations are singular events, rather than part of
a pattern. In Major, other remedies were available to cure the electoral discrimination. For instance, the Justice Department could have
denied preclearance under section 5.235 And the court remedied the
section 2 violation through declaratory judgment and injunction. 236
2.

Offices in Political Subdivisions

In contrast, if "racial politics do dominate the electoral process,"
the domination tends to occur more often at the city and county level
than at the state. 237 In addition, a district court is probably better
231. Bork received the vote of only one of the 17 Democratic senators from the states of the
old Confederacy. See Senate's Roll-Cal/ on the Bork Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1987, at 10, col.
3; see also Dowd, Winning One from the Gipper, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987, at 125 (coalition of
black, environmental, feminist, and labor groups key in Senate rejection of Bork nomination);
Garment, The War Against Robert Bork, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1988, at 17 (arguing that Southern
senators caved in to pressure from black interest groups).
232. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (E.D. Ark. 1988),
ajfd., 902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that Southern gubernatorial candidates have become
more responsive to the interests of black voters); UPI, June 14, 1989 (available on Nexis,
keyword Deathrow) (Governor Mabus, "at the urging of a powerful black leader, [] has agreed
to conduct a clemency hearing for two-time convicted killer Leo Edwards.").
233. 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983).
234. 574 F. Supp. at 333-37. For example, the governor threatened to veto a reapportionment plan (the Nunez Plan) that would facilitate the election of a black congressman. "Louisiana's chief executive has considerable power and influence, both dejure and de facto. Testimony
reflects that the Louisiana Legislature has never overridden a gubernatorial veto. A sufficient
number of legislators changed their position in response to the threatened veto to assure the
demise of the Nunez Plan." 574 F. Supp. at 333.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982). The Justice Department precleared the plan sponsored by
Governor Treen. For a criticism of the preclearance, see Guinier, supra note 124, at 408-11.
236. 574 F. Supp. at 355-56.
237. For example, a Westlaw search of 42 U.S.C. § 1973 cases decided in 1989-1990 revealed
twice as many challenges to county or city practices than to state practices. One explanation for
this is simply mathematical. A state contains numerous counties and political subdivisions, each
with their own political processes. A state government, however, has a limited number of statewide political processes and a limited number of statewide offices. Thus, plaintiffs have greater
opportunities to challenge practices by cities or counties than by states.
Another explanation for the greater number of challenges to the political processes of cities
and counties may be that pockets of racial politics persist in political subdivisions but do not taint
an entire state. Possibly, Congress had this in mind when it focused on "some communities in
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equipped to apply an " 'intensely local' " and functional appraisal to a
city or county's political processes than to a state govemment's. 238
For these reasons, courts should be more receptive of challenges to
city or county single-member offices than to state single-member posts.
Consequently, the Note focuses greater attention on the city or county
level of government than it did on state government.
a. Legislative and legislative-executive offices. Consider singlemember offices in a legislative or legislative-executive body, such as a
city council president or a chairperson of a county commission. Some
violations caused by the selection methods for these offices or by the
conduct of these officeholders could be cured with injunctions changing the method of selection or preventing particular conduct. 239 But
when at-large selection for these offices combines with the use of concentrated power by single-member officeholders and diminishes the influence of racial minorities, an injunction alone will not cure the
violation. A court cannot simply order a change from at-large to district elections for single-member posts because the offices being elected
cannot be chosen directly by. districts. 240 Instead of a change in election method, the court should change the distribution of powers of the
single-member office. For example, a court could order the chairperson position on a county commission rotated among the commission
members chosen by districts. 241 In this way, the position is held by
members elected by district, and all districts are represented.
Similarly, a court should not simply enjoin these single-member
offices from using their concentrated power to lessen minority influence, because this would require a constant monitoring of a local government. Instead, a court should deconcentrate the chairperson's
power by rotating it among the commission members. 242 In this way,
our Nation where racial politics do dominate the electoral process." SE.NATE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 211.
238. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
622 (1982)). The Court in Gingles also recognized that it must apply "a 'functional' view of
political process mandated by § 2." 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.
239. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
240. When at-large elections produce a violation of § 2, the typical remedy is to switch to
election by districts. See supra note 190. This remedy is not possible, however, when only one
office is to be elected. Consider the election of a chairperson of a county commission in a county
divided into five election districts. One district of the five cannot be chosen to elect the chairperson because that would exclude the other four districts from any participation in the selection
process. The county as a whole could be considered one district, but that would be an at-large
election, a result to be avoided.
241. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 298 (M.D. Ala. 1986), ajfd. in
part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246, 253 (11th Cir. 1987), reinstated on remand, 619 F.
Supp. 1546, 1547 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Warren v. City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1054 (M.D.
Fla. 1988), affd., 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989) (city agrees to allow any council person, not just
those elected at large, to serve as chairman and chairman pro-tern of the city council).
242. See supra note 241.
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the minority group can begin to protect itself in the political process
without further supervision by a court.
b. Executive offices. If a plaintiff establishes that an executive single-member office, such as a mayor, violates section 2, the cure may
require a greater restructuring of government than the remedy for a
chairperson. Isolated incidents of executive single-member offices violating the Act may be cured by the court with a traditional equitable
remedy such as an injunction targeted at a specific incident. 243 When
violations by an executive single-member office establish a pattern of
consistent activity designed to diminish minority participation in the
political process, a court might take one of two approaches to
restructuring. 244
One approach would be to diminish the power of the executive's
office by parceling out power to another office. For example, a vicemayor's office might be created with some of the mayor's former
power shifted to that office. This office might be filled by council
members on a rotating basis. 245 A second approach would be to
change a mayor-council form of government to a city commission with
a rotating chairperson or a hired executive. 246
243. See, e.g., Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (The
mayor intentionally discriminated against black candidates by withholding candidacy requirement information from them. The proper remedy was to enjoin the town to certify blacks as duly
elected members of town council.); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (The
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the city's reapportionment plan drawn by
the mayor to disadvantage his opponent. The plan resulted in a dilution of minority voting.).
244. Election at large, combined with the use of concentrated power over time by an executive single-member office, produces a unique pattern of violations. This combination also produces violations unique to legislative and legislative-executive single-member offices. Under this
Note's approach, single-member offices, depending on branch of government, require different
levels of proof of concentrated power necessary to establish a § 2 violation. Legislative and legislative-executive posts require a minimal showing on concentrated power. For example, a county
chairperson elected at-large from a county with polarized voting, the presence of a number of the
Senate factors, and a showing of concentrated power with the potential to diminish minority
influence could violate § 2. Plaintiffs would not have to show that the concentrated power was
actually used to diminish minority influence. In contrast, plaintiffs challenging an executive single-member post would be required to show actual use of power by the officeholder to diminish
minority influence.
The difference in the required proof of concentrated pawer stems from the differences in the
remedies available to replace at-large elections for these offices. At-large elections for legislative
and legislative executive-offices could be modified in ways that interfere minimally with the structures of local governments. For instance, election at-large can be changed to the equivalent of
election by district. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. In contrast, at-large election for
executive single-member posts cannot be simply switched to district elections because the only
possible district is the entire jurisdiction, the same as for at-large elections. Instead, to remedy a
violation, power from the single-member post must be parceled out to other offices or the local
government restructured. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. Because these remedies intrude more into the structure of local government than do remedies for legislative singlemember posts, the threshold showing on concentrated power is higher for executive single-member offices.
245. See, e.g., Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683 F. Supp. 1545 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (plan for
restructuring the city government included the office of vice-mayor to be held by council members and rotated among them).
246. For the benefits produced by having a commission with a rotating chairperson or some
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A critic might claim either of these two approaches clash with the
need for a single executive, accountable citywide, with the interests of
the entire city at heart. 247 This objection, however, ignores the political realities of racial discrimination and racially polarized voting. 248
Precisely because these ills exist, a white executive is often not accountable to the entire city, nor does he have the interests of the entire
town at heart; rather, he often protects only the interests of the majority voters.
Restructuring or parceling out power will actually increase citywide accountability by giving power to executives who represent majority and minority interests. A critic might counter that this will
become a spoils system, with the majority executive favoring his constituents during his term and the minority executive favoring his constituency during his term. More likely, a checking system will result
where neither executive is willing to favor his own constituents unduly
because he knows that the other executive can undo some favors and
reward his own constituents. 249 Even if a spoils system developed, minority voters would at least begin to share in the spoils they have been
denied.
A critic might also argue that these approaches recognize race to
the detriment of a colorblind society. 250 The Senate Report, however,
rejected this argument. 251 Courts and commentators, drawing on this
congressional intent, have also rejected arguments against the race
consciousness of remedies. 252 To achieve equal opportunities to elect
other apportionment of power, see Karlan, supra note 118, at 241 n.276. For the benefits produced by a hired executive, see Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 n.12 (11th Cir.
1987) (hired executive subject to greater control by the commission).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Marengo County Commn., 643 F. Supp. 232, 234-35 (S.D.
Ala. 1986), ajfd. sub nom Clark v. Marengo County, 811 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1987) (The county
argued that it needed to retain an at-large chairperson for the County Commission and Board of
Education because the chairperson must be able to represent the interests of the entire county.).
248. See, e.g., Westwego Citizens for Better Govt. v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201 (5th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting the cost or administrative upheaval caused by restructuring as factors to
consider in determining whether § 2 has been violated).
249. See Karlan, supra note 118, at 241 n.276 for an example of how this checking function
would work.
250. See, e.g., Marengo County Commn., 643 F. Supp. at 232-33 (district judge expressing his
concern that the remedy mandated by the Appeals Court hampers achievement of a colorblind
society).
251. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208-11.
252. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984) noted:
Congress necessarily took into account and rejected as unfounded, or assumed as outweighed, several risks to fundamental political values that opponents of the amendments
urged in committee deliberations and floor debate. Among these were the risk that the
judicial remedy might actually be at odds with the judgment of significant elements in the
racial minority; the risk that creating "safe" black-majority single member districts would
perpetuate racial ghettos and racial polarization in voting behavior; the risk that reliance
upon the judicial remedy would supplant the normal, more healthy processes of acquiring
political power by registration, voting and coalition building; and thefundamental risk that

the recognition of "group voting rights" and the imposing of affirmative obligations upon gov-
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and to participate in the political process, race must be taken into
account.
Finally, a critic may argue that spreading power or restructuring
implicates section 2's proviso against proportional representation because these remedies provide a minority group with a proportional
share of a single-member office. 253 Certainly, section 2 denies any
"right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population."254 Thus, a lack of proportional
representation does not trigger a section 2 violation.255 A minority
group does, however, have the right to an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of its choice.256
When this right is violated, nothing in section 2 prohibits a court from
employing proportional representation as a remedy. 257
emment to secure those rights by race-conscious electoral mechanisms was alien to the American political tradition.
Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 356-57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
See Blacksher, Drawing Single Member Districts to Comply with the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of1982, 17 URB. LAW. 347 (1985). "Now Congress has squarely rejected the argument that a race-conscious Voting Rights Act would be bad public policy. The results of
amended section 2 of the Act extends the consideration of race beyond mere avoidance of retrogression [(a § 5 requirement)] to full consideration of a plan's racial fairness." Id. at 352.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982); see, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 43, at 21.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982). Similarly, the Court has held that minority groups have no
constitutional right to proportional representation. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
78-79 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. I, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims
to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?,
34 HAsTINGS L.J. 1, 51 n.320 (1982) (tracing and questioning the Court's resistance to a right of
proportional representation).
255. An inequality in the number of candidates elected by a minority group may, however,
provide some evidence of vote dilution. See supra note 100 (factor 7); see also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30; 74-75 (1986). While the election of a few minority officials does not bar a
vote dilution claim, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75, courts have held that persistent proportional representation would preclude a finding of vote dilution. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77.
Even persistent proportional representation should not preclude a minority group from arguing that its elected representatives received an unequal opportunity to participate in the political
process. Suppose that a minority group comprising 20 percent of a city consistently elected one
offive city council members, but this representative was excluded from key deliberations between
the mayor and the other council members. In that case, the minority group should be able to
challenge the actions of the mayor and council because their actions deny the minority group's
representatives an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982); see also Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 148 (2d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) ("Although the Act makes clear that a class has no
right to elect its members by numerical proportion, the class does have a right to an opportunity,
equal to that of other classes to obtain such representation.") (emphasis omitted).
257. Senators East and Helms, during the debates on amending§ 2, proposed amendments
to prevent federal courts from employing proportional representation as a remedy. Senator East
proposed an amendment explicitly proscribing proportional representation as a remedy. 128
CoNG. REc. 14137 (June 17, 1982). The Senate rejected the East amendment. Id. at 14140.
Senator Helms then proposed an amendment specifically allowing courts to employ proportional
representation. Id. Senator Helms voted against his amendment, explaining that by voting
against the amendment Congress would prevent courts from using proportional representation.
Id. at 14141-42. The Senate defeated the Helm's amendment, not because the Senate rejected
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c. Nonlegislative functionaries. Objections to applying the Act to
single-member offices are less likely to be raised in cases that require
less restructuring of local government. For example, challenges to single-member offices falling under the nonlegislative functionary heading would be less likely than executive offices to require restructuring
as a remedy. According to the Dillard court, examples of nonlegislative functionaries include tax collectors, sheriffs, and probate
judges.2ss Nonlegislative functionaries would most likely violate the
Act in ways not peculiar to single-member offices. For instance, a tax
collector might be chosen by a slating process that diminishes minority influence in the process. Nonlegislative functionaries have few opportunities to diminish influence in ways unique to single-member
offices. Consider an elected sheriff who makes a number of decisions
that harm minority interests. The sheriff hires all white deputies, and
he places fewer police patrols in black neighborhoods while enforcing
the law more vigorously against accused black criminals.
However, the sheriff would presumably be subject to the control of
the executive and legislative branches of his county govemment.259
This would enable minority officials and voters to influence the sheriff
in ways other than direct election. And, while the sheriff's acts are
discriminatory, the Voting Rights Act does not apply because the conduct does not interfere with opportunities to participate in the political
process. Therefore, the appropriate remedies for the sheriff's conduct
would be found in statutes like section 1983260 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act261 rather than in the Voting, Rights Act. In general,
restructuring will not be an appropriate remedy for nonlegislative
functionaries because they rarely exercise power in ways peculiar to
single-member offices.
The office of probate judge may, however, challenge that guideline.
proportional representation, but because the amendment was irrelevant since the Bill was not
intended to interfere with the equitable remedies employed by federal courts. Id. at 14141 (state·
ment of Sen. Edward Kennedy). For further discussion of the congressional activity on the issue
of proportional representation, see Boyd & Markman, supra note 1, at 1392-404, 1418-19; How·
ard & Howard, supra note 117, at 1624-26; McKenzie & Krauss, supra note 20, at 166-67; see
also Additional Remarks of Senator Hatch, SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 270 ("The 'com·
promise' provision also purports to establish an explicit prohibition upon subsection (a) giving
rise to any right to proportional representation. This is not quite the case. Most pointedly,
perhaps, there is nothing in the provision that addresses the issue of proportional representation
as a remedy.").
258. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 251 (11th Cir. 1987).
259. See, e.g., In Re Application of Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 188 N.J.
Super. 343, 457 A.2d 495, ajfd., 190 N.J. Super. 256, 463 A.2d 351 (1983) (per curiam), cert.
granted. 94 N.J. 587, 468 A.2d 225 (1983), ajfd., 99 N.J. 90, 491 A.2d 631 (1985) (per curiam)
(the legislature controls the duties of the sheriff and the activities of his office); Brownstown
Township v. County of Wayne, 68 Mich. App. 244, 242 N.W.2d 538 (1976) (the legislature may
vary the duties of a sheriff's office).
260. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982).
261. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1982).
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Probate judges often serve dual functions, wearing the hats of both
judge and chairperson of a county commission.262 When a probate
judge acts as a chairperson, he may diminish influence in ways peculiar to single-member offices. 263 In that case, a court should consider
removing the probate judge from the county commission or retaining
the judge as a member of the commission but order the chairposition
rotated. But suppose a probate judge is serving only as a judge and she
is the sole probate judge in a jurisdiction. Could this judge, as a singlemember office, be open to challenge?264 Judgeships, like other elected
positions, are open to challenge under section 2. 265 Thus, if the jurisdiction chose the single judge with a discriminatory election method
or by a process that otherwise diminished participation in the political
process, a court could cure the violation with an injunction targeted at
the specific practice.
Rarely, however, would a judge diminish influence in a way peculiar to single-member offices. Yet, a single judge might be challenged
under the Stallings rationale. Suppose a single judge made all the judicial decisions for a large county, like the 495 square-mile county in
Stallings, while other counties of comparable size and caseloads had
three or more judges assigned. A plaintiff might challenge this judicial
assignment, arguing that the policy behind the assignment was tenuous and possibly evidence of intentional discrimination. 266 If a plaintiff satisfied the other prerequisites for a challenge, the appropriate
remedy might be adding judges to the county and electing them by
district.
CONCLUSION

Single-member offices can impede the goals of section 2 both in
262. See, e.g., United States v. Dallas County Commn., 661 F. Supp. 955, 951 (S.D. Ala.
1987) (noting that 33 of 67 counties in Alabama have probate judges who also chair the county
commission).
263. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dillard chairperson.
264. The court in Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 51920 & n.25 (M.D. Ala. 1989), draws on the plaintiff's failure to challenge districts and circuits
with only one judge as a recognition that these offices are single-member and not open to
challenge.
265. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988); Martin v. Mabus, 700
F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
266. The Senate Report recognizes a tenuous policy as evidence indicating an unequal opportunity to elect a candidate of the minority group's choice and to participate in the political process. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 207. The Report notes that "[i]f the procedure
markedly departs from past practices or from practices elsewhere in the jurisdiction, that bears
on the fairness of its impact." Id. at n.117. In City of Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings,
829 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of Carrollton
Branch of the NAACP, 485 U.S. 936 (1988), the court found that the legislature switched from a
five-member commission to a single-member commission for Carroll County to discriminate intentionally against black citizens by preventing them from electing a commissioner.
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ways similar to multi-member offices and in ways unique to singlemember offices. Therefore, single-member posts should be subject to
challenge under section 2, rather than immune from challenge as suggested by some courts.
A traditional understanding of electoral discrimination - with its
focus on disenfranchisement, candidate diminution, and vote dilution
- explains how a single-member office can violate section 2 in ways
similar to a multi-member office. This traditional understanding also
teaches that these violations by single-member offices should be cured
with remedies similar to those used for violations by multi-member
offices.
This traditional understanding of electoral discrimination, however, fails to identify how single-member offices can violate the Act in
unique ways. At-large elections for single-member offices can place
these offices beyond reach of minority voters. The power concentrated
in single-member offices can diminish the opportunity of minority citizens and their elected officials to participate in the political process.
Thus, these characteristics of single-member posts combine to create
an inequality in both the opportunity to elect and the opportunity to
participate. To remedy these unique violations, courts should consider
restructuring single-member offices to decrease their concentrated
power.
Minority citizens have increased their participation in the political
process, but obstacles to full participation remain. Subjecting singlemember offices to challenge breaks down a remaining barrier to full
participation in the political process.

- Edward J. Sebold

